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ARTICLES 
CORPORATE PATENTS:  OPTIMIZING 
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO 
INNOVATION OPPORTUNITIES AND 
INVENTION DISCOVERIES 
RICHARD S. GRUNER∗ 
Corporate patents1—that is, utility patents2 owned by 
corporations3—are critically important, yet poorly understood creatures 
 
* Richard S. Gruner is a registered patent attorney and a former inside counsel for the IBM 
Corporation.  He is presently a Professor of Law at the Whittier Law School.  Professor 
Gruner is a member of the New York and California state bars and a graduate of the 
Columbia University School of Law (LL.M. 1982), the University of Southern California Law 
School (J.D. 1978), and California Institute of Technology (B.S. 1975).  He is the co-author, 
with Shubha Ghosh and Jay Kesan, of INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES AND MATERIALS (forthcoming 2006). 
1. Patent owners can prevent others from making, using, or selling a patented 
invention.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).  Generally, corporations can realize the commercial 
value of these patents by using or selling the patented items or services themselves or by 
permitting (i.e. “licensing”) others to use or sell the patented items or services in exchange for 
royalty payments.  Companies that choose to use or sell patented inventions themselves 
realize the value of the associated patents by setting the prices for their products or services 
at elevated levels that reflect the fact that the corporations are the sole legitimate sources or 
users of the patented inventions.  Companies that choose to license their patented inventions 
to others realize the value of their patents through the licensees’ royalty payments.  Which of 
these means is the best for a patent holder to maximize patent value depends largely on 
whether the patent holder or licensee is the most efficient and effective in delivering products 
and services based on a patented invention to consumers. 
2. Utility patents are the primary variety of patents issued under U.S. law.  They 
control the making, using, and selling of useful devices, materials, and processes.  Id. §§ 101, 
154.  Utility patents should be distinguished from two much less common types of patents:  
design patents (which control ornamental designs for useful products) and plant patents 
(which control new varieties of asexually reproducing plants).  See id. §§ 171, 161. 
3. The focus of the Article is on business corporations that seek and utilize patents.  
Most U.S. utility patents are owned by corporations.  See infra Part I.A.  However, some such 
patents are doubtless owned by partnerships and other collectively owned business entities.  
In addition, non-profit organizations, such as universities, comprise a small component of 
organizational patent owners.  See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S.  
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES—UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969–2000,  
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of intellectual property law.  Under U.S. law, corporations are not 
proper patent applicants because corporations do not discover 
inventions, individuals do.4  Despite this, corporations are frequently 
assigned patent rights from individual inventors, often before the 
patents involved have even issued.5  As a consequence, corporations 
own and control most patents.6  Corporations use patents to structure 
and facilitate a wide variety of valuable transactions and activities.7 
This Article argues that innovation concerning today’s complex 
technologies often requires corporate efforts and that changes in patent 
and corporate laws are needed to fully promote effective and efficient 
 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/asgn/table_1.htm (last visited Sept. 27,  
2002) [hereinafter U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES—UTILITY PATENT GRANTS] (placing 
university ownership for new patents issued in 2000 at 2% of all utility patents).  To the 
extent that these non-corporate entities share the business objectives or organizational modes 
of action exhibited by business corporations, these other types of patent-owning entities 
should be governed by the considerations discussed here. 
4. Only an individual inventor or group of individual inventors can apply for a utility 
patent under U.S. law.  35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1), 116 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 1.41(a) (2004).  The 
failure of the actual inventor of a device or process to apply for a related patent will prevent 
the procurement of patent protection in most instances.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2000) 
(providing that a person shall not be entitled to a patent if “he did not himself invent the 
subject matter sought to be patented”); Lorenz v. Berkline Corp., 215 F. Supp. 869, 880 (N.D. 
Ill. 1963) (“A patent applied for by one who is not the inventor is unauthorized by law and 
void, whether taken out in the name of the applicant or of any assignee of his; it confers no 
right as against the public.”). 
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).  Corporations may obtain assignments of patent rights 
even before a patent issues through two mechanisms.  First, an inventor who has applied for a 
patent may be an employee of a corporation and have a pre-existing obligation under her 
terms of employment to assign any patent rights resulting from her employment to her 
corporate employer.  Second, the inventor may have acted as an independent individual in 
making the invention covered by a patent, but have arranged during the often long pendency 
of the patent application (on average, approximately three years) to assign the inventor’s 
patent rights to a corporation in exchange for compensation.  In either of these types of 
circumstances, the relevant patent will be issued in the corporation’s name with a notation 
reflecting the identity of the inventor that was the original patent applicant. 
 Corporations may also obtain ownership of patent rights after a patent has issued by 
obtaining an assignment from the initial patent holder or by acquiring (through mergers or 
other means) corporations or other legal entities that were themselves patent owners.  
Indeed, when large corporations acquire start-up companies that have discovered and 
developed a valuable new technology or product design, the patent rights of the start-up 
companies and the exclusive commercialization opportunities those rights imply are often 
among the most attractive features of the start-ups to the acquiring companies. 
6. See infra Part I.A. 
7. Intellectual property interests such as patents are so central to aiding modern 
corporate activities that, for many businesses, “[c]orporate value hinges not on the operation 
of production assets, but on the optimal financial exploitation of intellectual property.”  
GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  LICENSING AND 
JOINT VENTURE PROFIT STRATEGIES xiii (1993). 
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innovation in corporate environments.  The prevalence of patent 
ownership and exploitation by corporations reflect a fundamental but 
ill-appreciated truth about modern technological innovation.  Patent 
incentives encouraging innovation by individuals do not bring most new 
inventions to the public.  Rather, in many technological areas, corporate 
actions are the primary sources of innovation, hence, the main targets of 
patent incentives.  Corporate financing and operations encouraged by 
patents are frequently required to gather and apply the personnel, 
resources, and marketing skills needed for developing, manufacturing, 
selling, and delivering highly complex, new products based on patented 
designs. 
The discovery, perfection, and delivery to the public of new 
innovations through corporate processes require the initiation and 
funding of corresponding corporate enterprises.  Both patent and 
corporate laws can further these corporate processes if such laws are 
tailored to promote the efficient formation and operation of corporate 
organizations focused on innovative activities.  Changes in patent law 
standards may influence the perceived value of innovations in corporate 
settings,8 while changes in corporate laws may affect how funding is 
sought for corporate efforts to develop patented inventions and how 
patented innovations are transformed into useful, widely distributed 
products.9  An effective interplay between patent and corporate laws is 
needed to fully support and encourage corporate processes aimed at 
innovation.  Legal reforms should recognize the critical and potentially 
synergistic relationship between patent and corporate laws as 
complementary means to promote corporate innovation. 
This Article examines the often neglected linkage between patent 
and corporate laws and the roles that patents serve in promoting the 
discovery and commercialization of innovations by corporations.10  The 
 
8. See infra Part IV.A. 
9. See infra Part IV.B. 
10. The analysis presented here both extends and complements the work of Professor 
F. Scott Kieff.  Professor Kieff has emphasized the importance of patent laws in encouraging 
the commercialization of new technologies and the realization of associated societal benefits.  
See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001).  He has argued that the primary justification for patent rights lies 
in the incentives that patents provide for the commercialization of inventions.  Professor 
Kieff concludes that exclusive patent rights are needed to ensure that fears of free riders do 
not cause the commercialization of new, nonobvious technologies to be underemphasized, 
resulting in the distribution of related products and services to the public at sub-optimal 
levels.  See id. at 732–36.  The analysis presented here recognizes that the commercialization 
of products and services based on new technologies is strongly promoted by patent incentives, 
but it views the initiation and funding of corporate efforts to be the primary vehicle for this 
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roles of patents in aiding the activities of corporate innovators define 
the distinctive functions of corporate patents. 
The impacts of patents in the founding, growth, and maturation of 
corporations have been largely ignored by persons examining the 
significance and value of patent rights.11  Yet, because corporations 
comprise such a large component of patent holders, the effects of patent 
rights on corporations are important consequences of the patent system 
that deserve further study.  Likewise, corporate processes leading to 
patentable inventions and transforming such inventions into publicly 
available products are of major consequence for the patent system.  
Given that the ultimate end of patent law is to make products based on 
new technologies available to the public at the lowest net cost possible,12 
patent law goals are promoted by corporate processes that effectively 
and efficiently pursue technological innovation, product perfection, and 
the initial marketing of new products to the public. 
In short, the satisfaction of patent law goals depends on features of 
both patent and corporate laws that support innovation and related 
product perfection and popularization processes.  By treating patent and 
corporate law doctrines as complementary parts of the legal 
underpinnings encouraging organizational development of new 
 
commercialization.  Hence, the particular impact of patent laws on these corporate processes 
becomes a primary patent law focus.  In addition to extending Professor Kieff’s work in this 
respect, the present Article views corporate innovation as a joint product of structures and 
incentives created by the interplay of patent and corporate laws, suggesting that careful 
attention to how each of these types of law bear upon corporate innovation processes may 
have a valuable impact on public access to new technologies. 
11. The reasons for this neglect are unclear.  One possible source is the limited 
expertise of the specialists whose attention is needed to explore the interplay between patent 
and corporate laws.  Patent law specialists tend not to be versed in the corporate laws 
governing how patents are used in corporation settings.  Similarly, corporate and securities 
law specialists tend not to have strong backgrounds in patent law and, as a consequence, may 
overlook legal issues in the funding and operation of corporations that stem from the unusual 
features of patents as corporate property. 
 Another possible reason for the neglect of the interplay of patent and corporate laws 
may be that patents, unlike many other forms of property owned by corporations, may not 
have a clearly ascertainable liquidation value for which they could be sold immediately.  
Rather, the value of a patent is peculiarly tied to how the related patented technology is 
implemented in commercially successful products and services.  This means that patent value 
is often tied to the success of subsequent commercializing activities by corporate owners, 
thereby making patent value and corporate operating success unusually intertwined 
considerations. 
12. By minimizing the costs of producing and popularizing new inventions, an efficient 
version of patent law would maximize the net societal gains from each invention.  See, e.g., 
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 
316–18 (1992). 
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technologies and related products, changes in both patent and corporate 
laws promoting better innovative processes may be revealed. 
For example, the distinctive benefits of patents in supporting 
corporate research and product development may justify extending 
patent rights to different types of subject matters and infringing 
activities than would be the case if patents were tailored just to 
encourage the efforts of individual innovators.13  An organization-
oriented body of patent law may be significantly different than an 
individual-oriented one.14 
Similarly, corporate laws might be reshaped to better encourage 
modes of corporate formation, financing, operation, and ownership 
transfer that will support socially valuable innovation and product 
propagation efforts by corporations. 
This Article identifies the distinctive public benefits of patent rights 
in corporate contexts by viewing those rights from corporate 
perspectives.  It assesses the impacts of patent rights on several types of 
innovative activities typically undertaken through group processes and 
collective resources assembled and applied by corporations.  The Article 
also considers how patents promote these sorts of group activities and 
applications of superhuman resources by corporations, focusing on 
types of patent impacts that are different from the influence of patents 
on individuals. 
Shifting from a descriptive to a normative focus, the Article provides 
some examples of the types of patent and corporate law doctrines that 
might be adjusted to better promote optimal innovation and product 
introduction efforts by corporations.  It argues that such adjustments 
can enhance the role of patent rights in promoting the success, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of companies that are technological 
innovators.  These benefits can be achieved by increasing the value and 
incentive effects of patents themselves and by expanding the impact of 
patents on innovation-enhancing conduct such as public investment in 
corporate innovators. 
These changes will promote the ultimate aim of the patent system to 
enhance technological innovations available to the public.  The public 
benefits resulting from an innovation generally do not depend on 
 
13. See infra Part IV.A.4–5. 
14. Because the public’s primary interest in recognizing patents and related constraints 
on patented inventions is in gaining access to greater numbers of useful inventions through 
efficient development processes, a shift to a more organization-centered patent law will serve 
the public interest to the extent that the shift produces more patentable inventions or reduces 
the net development cost of particular inventions. 
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whether the innovation occurs through corporate or individual 
activities.  Hence, increases in the number of innovations realized by 
corporations or decreases in the net costs of discovering innovations and 
bringing related products to public availability are clearly in the public 
interest.  To the extent that they alter the number or cost of useful 
products in these ways, changes in the scope of patent rights and the 
ways those rights are used in corporate activities supporting innovation 
will be important advances in the patent system. 
I. CORPORATE DOMINANCE OF PATENT OWNERSHIP AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
Utility patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) in recent years reflect a striking picture of corporate 
ownership and control of patent interests.15  Corporate ownership of 
patents has remained at 80% or greater of all utility patents since 1991 
and, in recent years, has risen to almost 90%.16  In some technological 
fields, corporations are almost the sole type of patent recipient, thereby 
reflecting the need for large-scale, corporate-financed resources to 
 
15. Corporate ownership of utility patents is profiled in a number of statistical reports 
prepared by the USPTO.  These include the following: 
(1) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,  
ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, JANUARY 1, 1963–DECEMBER 31, 2001 (2002),  
 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/all_tech.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003)  
 [hereinafter ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT] (describing percentages of corporate patent  
 ownership). 
(2) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TOP TEN PATENTING 
ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm#top_org  
 (last visited Oct. 2, 2002) (containing single year reports for 1991 through 2001). 
 (3) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS  
 REPORT, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm#TO (last visited  
 Oct. 2, 2002) (containing single year reports providing an extended list of prolific  
 patenting organizations receiving patents for 1995 through 2001). 
 (4) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,  
 U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES—UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS  
 1969–2000, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/univ_toc.htm  
 (last visited Dec. 16, 2002) (analyzing university-owned patents in comparison with all  
 patents and all corporate patents). 
(5) UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,  
PATENTING BY TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION,  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/classes.htm (last visited Oct. 2,  
2002) (analyzing utility patents granted to organizations in the five year period from 1997 
through 2001 with separate analyses for each primary patent classification class). 
16. ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-2; see also infra Part I.A–B. 
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participate as an effective innovator.17  In such settings, innovation is 
truly a corporate process; thus, patents, if they are to have any 
meaningful impact, must advance the useful arts through corporate 
incentives and corporate responses. 
This section examines current levels of corporate patent ownership, 
the evolution of that ownership in recent years, the concentration of 
patent ownership among a few large corporations, and the disparate 
patterns of corporate patent ownership in different technology domains. 
A. Corporate Domination of Patent Ownership 
In 2000, corporations—both domestic and foreign—received 87% of 
all utility patents.18  Of this percentage, 45% were received by U.S. 
corporations and 42% were received by foreign corporations.19  
Individual owners accounted for only 13% of all new patents.20 
The USPTO treats university-owned patents as a form of corporate-
owned patents.  Hence, these corporate patent figures include 
university-owned patents.  However, in recent years, such university-
owned patents have accounted for only 2% of all utility patents and 
4.5% of all corporate owned patents.21  If university-owned patents are 
omitted, business corporations accounted for 85% of all utility patents 
in 2001.  Given the small fraction of the total utility patent figures 
corresponding to non-business organizations such as universities, 
corporate patents will be assumed to be owned by business corporations 
in the remainder of this Article. 
B. Historical Patterns of Corporate Patent Ownership 
The high degree of corporate patent ownership just described is not 
a recent phenomenon.  Although there has been a rise in corporate 
ownership over this period, high percentages of corporate patent 
ownership have prevailed for at least the last decade.  The fractions of 
corporate utility patent ownership over this period have been as 
follows:22 
 
17. See infra Part I.D. 
18. ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-2. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. University-owned patents constituted 4.4% of all corporate owned patents in 2000 
and have hovered between 3.4% and 4.9% since 1991.  U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES—
UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, supra note 3. 
22. ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-1, A1-2. 
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Year Total 
Patents 
Corporate
Owned 
Domestic 
Corporations
Foreign 
Corporations 
1991 96,513 80% 41% 39% 
1992 97,444 80% 41% 39% 
1993 98,342 82% 43% 39% 
1994 101,676 81% 43% 38% 
1995 101,419 81% 43% 38% 
1996 109,645 82% 44% 38% 
1997 111,983 83% 45% 38% 
1998 147,521 84% 45% 39% 
1999 153,485 84% 45% 39% 
2000 157,495 85% 45% 40% 
2001 166,039 87% 45% 42% 
 
Clearly, there has been a slow but steady increase in the fractional 
level of corporate ownership, initially involving increases only in 
domestic corporate ownership but most recently reflecting a gain by 
foreign corporations as well.23 
While these percentage figures are important means to study the 
composition of patent ownership and the growing control of 
corporations over patents and patented inventions, such percentages 
mask to some degree the enormous magnitude of patents under 
corporate control at the end of this period in comparison with corporate 
patent ownership levels at the beginning of the period.  Focusing on just 
the changes between 1991 and 2001, the actual numbers of patents 
under corporate control changed as follows:24 
 
Year Total 
Patents 
Corporate 
Owned 
Domestic 
Corporations
Foreign 
Corporations 
1991 6,513 76,727 39,133 37,594 
2001 166,039 143,269 74,327 68,942 
Change +72% +87% +90% +83% 
 
 
 
23. This growth in the fraction of utility patents owned by corporations seems to have 
extended back before the eleven years described here.  Over the period of 1963 to 1987, 
corporations accounted for 76% of all utility patents, compared with 80% in 1991 and 87% in 
2001.  Id. at A1-2. 
24. Id. 
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It is difficult to know with certainty the source of these major leaps in 
patent numbers, but several potential explanations are plausible. 
First, this increase in patent totals, particularly in corporate patent 
totals, may reflect an increased confidence in patents generally as 
sources of intellectual property protections.25  Such an increase in 
confidence may be a consequence of changes in patent laws and altered 
perceptions of patents by both legal and business specialists.  The 
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals of patent cases, and the resulting development 
of a unified, relatively predictable body of case law regarding the scope 
and strength of patent rights may have reassured technology innovators 
about the probable extent of patent rights for particular innovations and 
thereby caused more innovators to seek patents.26  Confidence that the 
resulting patent rights would have an enforceable impact over a 
predictable range of commercial activities may have caused more 
inventors—or the corporations backing those inventors—to pay the 
price—in both patent prosecution dollars and disclosures to 
competitors—associated with patent applications.  Under this analysis, 
the increased number of patents seen in recent years is a descriptive, but 
non-technological phenomenon.  That is, the increase may not reflect 
more inventions, just more patents concerning the type and number of 
inventions that were already being produced.  This type of increase in 
patents produces a corresponding gain in the description of new 
technologies through more numerous patent disclosures. 
A second explanation may be that there really has been an increase 
in innovation in this period, at least in the significantly new areas that 
are likely to lead to patentable inventions.  Certainly a number of 
fields—from biotechnology to telecommunications electronics to 
information processing—have experienced breakthroughs in this period, 
 
25. See, e.g., George M. Sirilla et al., The Advice of Counsel Defense to Increased Patent 
Damages, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 705, 705 (1992) (“Since the creation of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in October 1982, the apparent value 
of U.S. patents has increased dramatically.”); Robert P. Taylor, Twenty Years of the Federal 
Circuit:  An Overview, in 1 PLI’S EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 9, 12 (David Bender & Robert P. Taylor co-chairs, 2002) (concluding that 
the net effect of the Federal Circuit’s effort to clarify patent law is “readily apparent in the 
significantly greater value that patents enjoy today”). 
26. See, e.g., KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC:  
UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 43–44 (2000) (describing the increased use of 
patents to protect new technologies and creation of business assets following the clarification 
of patent law by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the associated rise in the 
perceived value of patents among business leaders). 
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leading to streams of patentable innovations.  Furthermore, advances in 
computers and the resulting use of computer-based information 
processing methods as broadly applicable analytic tools have caused re-
evaluations and redesigns of devices and processes in a wide range of 
fields, in some cases producing new computer-based or computer-
assisted designs that are significant enough departures from prior 
versions to qualify for patents.  This may simply be a boom time in 
technological innovation, resulting in a corresponding growth in 
corporate patents. 
However, a third, business-related explanation may account for 
much of the increase in corporate patents seen in the patent data.  
Innovators or their business backers may be obtaining larger numbers of 
patents because patents are increasingly being seen as critical 
commercialization tools for new innovations.  As the risk and cost of 
developing new technologies grows, the risk containment and 
investment attraction attainable through patent rights may seem 
increasingly desirable.  Patent-based business models may seem 
increasingly critical as innovators or their business associates look ahead 
not only to the full course of efforts needed to pursue engineering 
discoveries that may support new products, but also to the broader set 
of activities needed to transform raw engineering discoveries into 
marketable product designs, to establish manufacturing programs for 
these products, and to gain public acceptance of the products through 
initial marketing campaigns.27 
The great expense that is often entailed in pursuing the full course of 
 
27. A number of expensive activities may be needed to bring a raw technological 
advance from the point of partial appreciation of its potential utility sufficient to gain a patent 
to the later stage of widespread delivery to the public of useful, commercially successful 
products based on the technology.  Critical post-invention steps in the commercialization of 
products based on a new technology can include the following: 
 (1) Linking a technological discovery to a worthwhile marketing opportunity; 
 (2) Having the new technology endorsed by parties whose opinions matter; 
 (3) Incubating the technology to determine its full potential and cost-effectiveness; 
 (4) Mobilizing adequate resources for demonstration of the technology; 
 (5) Successfully demonstrating the technology in the context where it will be used; 
 (6) Mobilizing market constituents needed to popularize the technology and to deliver its 
benefits; 
 (7) Promoting final products and services to skeptical customers; 
 (8) Choosing an appropriate business formula to access the relevant business context; 
and 
 (9) Sustaining commercialization after product launch. 
VIJAY K. JOLLY, COMMERCIALIZING NEW TECHNOLOGIES:  GETTING FROM MIND TO 
MARKET 2–3 (1997). 
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these post-invention efforts, coupled with the need to generate 
extensive investor support to cover these expenses, may be causing 
inventors and entrepreneurs to focus increasingly on patents as 
necessary elements of viable development strategies for new products.28  
Absent patents, innovators can only seek investment backing for new 
products based on the inventors’ personal skills in commercializing an 
innovation before competitors do and the tenuous intellectual property 
protections afforded by trade secret laws.  With one or more patents 
covering a key bit of technology, innovators can promise investors a 
stake in a particular, exclusive marketing opportunity as bounded by the 
technology controlled by the patent rights and the patent holder’s ability 
to exclude others from this opportunity through the exercise of those 
rights.  Particularly in resource intensive fields, a start-up enterprise 
needs patent rights to even catch the preliminary attention of potential 
investors, most of whom have many investment alternatives to choose 
from and who see the risk containment characteristics of patent rights as 
a minimum threshold feature of an investment worth considering.29  In 
 
28. The encouragement of these types of post-invention commercialization activities 
was a primary goal of the drafters of our present Patent Act.  See generally Kieff, supra note 
10, at 736–46.  According to Giles Rich, a central drafter of the Patent Act and later a major 
figure in shaping patent law as a federal appellate judge, the primary justification for patent 
rights as granted under the Act lay not in the encouragement of invention or disclosure of 
new technologies.  Rather, a third type of inducement via patent rights was key: 
 The third aspect of inducement is by far the greatest in practical importance.  It 
applies to the inventor but not solely to him, unless he is his own capitalist. . . . It 
might be called the inducement to risk an attempt to commercialize the invention.  
It is the “business” aspect of the matter which is responsible for the actual delivery 
of the invention into the hands of the public. 
Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, Part II, 24 
J. PAT. OFF. & TRADEMARK SOC’Y  159, 177 (1942). 
29. Investment capital investors are frequently deluged with requests for funding and 
will typically use the strength of intellectual property interests as one of several preliminary 
screening criteria for winnowing down pools of possible companies for investment.  A typical, 
experienced investment capital investor may receive one thousand funding proposals a year, 
of which only one hundred receive more than a cursory review and about five will receive 
investment backing.  In making the threshold choice of which companies to scrutinize in 
detail, the present or projected patent portfolios or other intellectual property interests of 
various companies seeking investment provide relatively easily assessed indicators of 
investment value.  Absent strong intellectual property protections that appear likely to ensure 
some market exclusivity and associated profit potential in light of a company’s business plans, 
a company will typically not attract sufficient attention to gain full scrutiny of other, more 
complex business characteristics such as the strengths of the company’s management team 
and products and how these relate to the comparable qualities of competitors.  In short, 
patents and other risk-reducing intellectual property interests serve as threshold indicators of 
potential business success because these interests are relatively easily assessed at early stages 
of business investment evaluations.  See James. E. Malackowski & David I. Wakefield, 
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short, patents may have become the entry ticket into the venture capital 
derby, an essential business model feature of the viable start-up 
company.30  Whatever their incentives for increased technology 
development, patents may be being sought in larger and larger numbers 
as part of corporate business development strategies, primarily because 
the ownership of patents serves to attract the investment needed for 
commercialization of high-tech products. 
C.  Concentration of Corporate Patent Ownership 
Within the group of corporations receiving utility patents in 2001, 
patent ownership was highly concentrated in the hands of a few large-
scale corporate owners.  Of the 143,269 patents received by corporate 
owners in 2001, the ten corporations with the largest patent numbers 
received 16,758 of those patents, approximately 12% of the total.31  
These ten corporations controlled a substantial fraction of the total 
range of new devices and processes emerging from the patent system in 
this year. 
This degree of concentration in corporate patent ownership, 
however, was not limited to the top ten corporations.  Looking at a 
broader set of corporations, the top one hundred corporate patent 
recipients accounted for 51,833 patents, 31.2% of all new utility patents 
in 2001.32  A further breakdown of corporate patents issued in 2001 
 
Venture Investment Grounded in Intellectual Capital, in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS:  INVESTING 
WISELY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 157, 162–65 (Bruce Berman ed., 2002). 
30. Even after a promising technology is discovered, the smooth and successful 
commercialization of the technology often depends on further resource allocations in order to 
bring products incorporating the technology to the public.  Both technical promise and 
further enthusiasm by those with necessary resources are needed to avoid having the progress 
of new technologies stalled on the path towards useful products.  In order to bring products 
successfully to the public, commercialization frequently depends on successfully managing 
two things:  “creating enough value in a predecessor stage to make a technology worth taking 
further, and mobilizing stakeholders concerned with the next stage and convincing them of its 
future potential.”  JOLLY, supra note 27, at 13.  Patent rights and the promise of exclusive 
marketing opportunities for patented products are part of the means that patent law provides 
to mobilize business executives and investors to back the product design, manufacturing, and 
marketing efforts needed to actually deliver patented products and the benefits of a new 
technology to the public. 
31. ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-1;  
UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRELIMINARY LIST OF TOP PATENTING  
ORGANIZATIONS, CALENDAR YEAR 2001 (2002),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/top01cos.htm [hereinafter TOP TEN  
PATENTING ORGANIZATIONS 2001]. 
32. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
ORGANIZATIONS 2001 (2002), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_01.pdf 
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shows the following percentages of patents issued to the indicated 
groups of corporate patent recipients:33 
 
 
While these ranking categories have somewhat arbitrary boundaries, 
they serve to illustrate the overall pattern of concentration in corporate 
patent ownership.  A few corporations at the very top of the patent 
ownership list control a very high percentage of patents per corporation.  
The largest single corporate patent recipient, the IBM Corporation, 
accounted for 2% of all utility patents by itself.34 
A first tier of companies, corresponding to the top ten companies, 
received more than a thousand patents per company in 2001 alone.35  
The intellectual property assets accumulated by each of these 
companies in this one year reflect a broad set of controls over numerous 
inventions.  The scope of technology controls gained by these 
companies in this one year is even more significant than the number of 
patents suggests because the control associated with these patents will 
sweep into the future over the life of the patents each company 
received. 
A second tier of companies, corresponding to the next ninety 
companies in the patent recipient rankings, accounted for another 21% 
of patents.36  These companies each received numbers of patents in the 
hundreds in 2001 and, thus, were also positioned to maintain control 
over a substantial number of technological advances in their fields, 
 
[hereinafter PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS 2001]. 
33. See id.  The average patent numbers in the last column were obtained by taking the 
total number of patents obtained by corporations in the indicated ranking group and dividing 
by the number of corporations included in the ranking group.  For example, the total number 
of patents obtained for the corporations ranked one through ten in receipt of patents was 
16,758 patents, producing an average of 16,758/10 or 1676 for each corporation in this ranking 
group. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. 
36. See id. 
Ranking Percentage of 
Total 
Range of 
Patents 
Average Patents for 
Ranking Group 
1–10 10.1% 3411 to 1166 1676 per corporation 
11–100 21.0% 1149 to 168 388 per corporation 
101–436 15.1% 167 to 40 75 per corporation 
437–26,693 40.7% 39 to 1 2.6 per corporation 
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although not nearly as many developments as the top ten companies. 
A third tier of companies, corresponding to the remainder of the 
corporations for which the USPTO tracked and reported company-
specific patent totals, received between 40 and 167 patents.37  Even the 
smallest of these patent totals, if obtained regularly by a corporation, 
would probably be sufficient to maintain control over future products in 
a particular market segment or sub-domain of a commercial field. 
Finally, a fourth tier of corporate patent owners included a large 
number of corporations receiving relatively few patents each.  This tier 
accounted for 40.7% of all utility patents issued in 2001.38  As suggested 
by the average of 2.6 patents per company in this group, the group was 
comprised mostly of companies receiving one or two patents and a few 
that obtained somewhat more.39  Many of the companies in this group—
literally tens of thousands of small companies with one or two patents—
are probably start-up companies that have staked their futures on the 
commercialization of a new technology corresponding to their narrow 
patent interests.  The number of these corporate holders of small-scale 
patent interests suggests the presence of numerous instances of 
relatively isolated technological innovation outside of large corporate 
environments.  However, the large number of companies with only a 
few patents also highlights the need for active and effective corporate 
financing of small companies if the technologies being promoted by 
these relatively small-scale patent holders are to be developed into 
marketable products available to the public. 
In addition to the increase in the percentage of patents owned by 
corporate patent owners generally, the concentration of patent 
ownership of the largest corporate patent owners also increased in the 
past decade.  During this period, the fraction of all utility patents owned 
by a few large companies has steadily grown.  The following table tracks 
the percentage of all utility patents received by the top ten corporate 
patent owners:40 
 
37. See id. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. See ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 15, at A1-1; UNITED  
STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRELIMINARY LIST OF TOP PATENTING  
ORGANIZATIONS, CALENDAR YEAR 1991 (1992),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/top91cos.htm; UNITED STATES  
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRELIMINARY LIST OF TOP PATENTING  
ORGANIZATIONS, CALENDAR YEAR 1995 (1996),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/top95cos.htm; TOP TEN PATENTING  
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A similar trend produced increased concentration in the patent 
ownership among the top one hundred patent recipients.  The number 
of patents received by the top one hundred corporations rose from 
29,647, or 29.2%, of all patents issued in 1995 to 51,666, or 31.2%, of all 
patents issued in 2001.41 
D. Varying Scope and Concentration of Corporate Patent Ownership 
Among Technology Fields 
In certain technology areas, high proportions of corporate patent 
ownership and high concentrations of such ownership among a very few 
companies have been particularly extreme in recent years.  Indeed, in a 
few complex, resource intensive areas, individual patent ownership of 
new patents has been almost unknown, reflecting the need for corporate 
backing to discover and commercialize most or all patentable advances.  
Because the numbers of patents issued in one year for certain 
technology areas was quite small, the patent data studied in this portion 
of the Article reflects totals for a five-year span, covering all utility 
patents issued in the 1997–2001 period. 
This Article does not attempt to document all of the corporate 
patent ownership patterns for all of the technology categories covered 
by U.S. patents.  The discussions in this subsection focus on a few 
important technology classes and the substantial variations in corporate 
patent ownership for those classes. 42  Among these technology areas, 
 
ORGANIZATIONS 2001, supra note 31. 
41. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
ORGANIZATIONS 1995 (1996), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_95.pdf; 
PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS 2001, supra note 32.  The USPTO’s reporting of corporate 
patent ownership in 1991 does not cover patent ownership by individual corporations other 
than the top few corporations, thereby precluding comparisons of patent ownership of the top 
one hundred corporations for 1991 with later figures. 
42. The USPTO classifies the technologies covered by particular patents into 
“technology classes.”  Technology classes are “based on (1) technology associated with a 
particular industry, or (2) subject matter having similar function, use, or structure.”  UNITED 
STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM I-1 
Year Total Patents Received by 
Top Ten Corporations 
Percentage of All Patents 
Granted to Top Ten 
Corporations 
1991 8,045 8.3% 
1995 9,991 9.9% 
2001 16,758 10.1% 
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three patterns of corporate patent ownership were found:  (1) in some 
fields corporate patent ownership is moderate and both corporate and 
individual ownership are significant; (2) in additional fields corporate 
patent ownership is very common, but spread among a substantial 
number of corporations; and (3) in a third group of technology areas 
corporate patent ownership is highly significant and ownership of 
patents is highly concentrated in a few companies.  These patterns of 
corporate patent ownership and a few of the technology domains that 
illustrate each pattern are described in the remainder of this subsection. 
1. Moderate Corporate Ownership 
While there are not many technology domains in which corporate 
patent owners do not play a highly significant role, there are a few areas 
of technology in which individual innovators constitute the bulk of 
patent owners.  For example, patents issued from 1997 through 2001 for 
new tool designs reflected a high percentage of patents owned by 
individuals and relatively little corporate ownership.43  Within this 
category, individually owned patents accounted for 84.5% of the total, 
while corporate-owned patents only accounted for 15.5%.44  Corporate 
ownership was spread among a substantial number of companies, with 
the top ten corporate patent recipients taking only 10.9% of all patents 
in this class. 45 
This pattern of patent ownership suggests that many innovators in 
this field are probably individuals or small groups of individual 
inventors working in isolation from corporate support and resources.  
Certainly, the relatively “low-tech” character of many new tool designs 
would probably put many innovations in this field within the reach of 
 
(2002), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/documents/overview_dec02.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2003).  Every patent application is assigned to one or more classification categories 
based on the technology addressed by the patent claims in the application.  If the application 
results in an issued patent, these classification designations are carried forward as part of the 
published patent record and provide a useful tool for searching for patents by technology 
type. 
43. These advances fall within the USPTO’s Class 81, Tools:  “In this class are tools 
which are not structurally limited to any classified art.  This class is limited to hand tools, 
except in [certain noted subclasses].”  UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,  
CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS 81-1 (2004),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc081/defs081.pdf. 
44. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 81, TOOLS,  
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/081_tor.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). 
45. See id. 
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independent inventors.  Furthermore, these sorts of devices may be 
encountered by individuals in their personal lives, leading to an 
appreciation of problems with present designs and innovative efforts to 
fix those problems that are undertaken by individuals in their personal 
capacities outside of any roles they may have as corporate employees.  
Such innovations developed on personal time with personal resources 
would typically fall outside any obligation to assign resulting patents to 
the individuals’ corporate employers, even if the individuals were 
employed by corporations.  Thus, the resulting patents tend to remain in 
the hands of the individuals who produce patentable tool designs. 
2. Extensive Corporate Ownership—Widely Distributed 
A second pattern of corporate patent ownership involving extensive 
corporate ownership distributed among a substantial number of 
corporations was present in several technology fields from 1997 through 
2001.  This pattern of patent ownership governed advances in such 
widely divergent technological classes as refrigeration equipment, 
bodies and tops of land vehicles, and artificial intelligence. 
Refrigeration advances46 showed a 74.4% ownership by corporations 
from 1997 through 2001, with only 25.6% of patents for such advances 
issued to individuals.47  The top ten corporate patent recipients 
accounted for 31.2% of all patents in this class.48 
The invention class covering bodies and tops of land vehicles49 
reflected a 62.5% corporate ownership from 1997 through 2001, with 
 
46. See UNITED STATES. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,  
CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS, CLASS 62, REFRIGERATION 62-1 (2004),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc062/defs062.pdf. 
 This class includes (1) processes and apparatus peculiar to removing heat from a 
substance, usually by a change of phase of a coolant or refrigerant, as by 
evaporation, melting or sublimation, (2) the resultant product of part (1), e.g., ice, 
liquefied or solidified gases, and (3) processes and apparatus peculiar to handling 
the latter as a stored product, not elsewhere provided for. 
Id. 
47. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 62,  
REFRIGERATION, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/062_tor.htm (last  
visited Feb. 4, 2003). 
48. See id. 
49. UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION  
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 296, LAND VEHICLES:  BODIES AND TOPS 296-1 (2003),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc296/defs296.pdf.  “This class includes  
patents relating to that portion of a land vehicle, secured to the running-gear thereof, which 
operates as a receptacle or load carrier, together with the top or cover therefor.”  See id. 
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37.5% of such patents issued to individuals.50  The top ten corporate 
patent holders accounted for 27.4% of all patents in this class.51 
For the patent class covering data processing inventions related to 
artificial intelligence,52 the degree of corporate ownership from 1997 
through 2001 was 81.2%, and the individual ownership was 18.8%.53  
The top ten corporate owners received 50.2% of all the patents issued in 
this class.54 
While corporations clearly predominated as patent owners in these 
technology classes, a substantial number of individuals also received 
patents in these areas, indicating that substantial advances were possible 
and even common in both individual and corporate contexts.  These 
types of technologies are apparently ones that can be explored at the 
cutting edge without the sorts of equipment or resources that belong 
exclusively to corporate innovators.  While corporate backing of some 
sort is apparently helpful and common, the involvement of massive 
corporations engaged in large-scale efforts within the field does not 
seem essential, as is reflected in the relatively small portion of the total 
number of patents received by the top ten corporate patent recipients.  
These technologies seem to be successfully advanced and 
commercialized by numerous small to medium-sized corporations rather 
than a few corporate giants that produce large quantities of patentable 
advances. 
 
50. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,  
PATENTING BY TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION,  
1997–2001, CLASS 296, LAND VEHICLES:  BODIES AND TOPS,  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/296_tor.htm (last visited Dec. 14,  
2002). 
51. See id. 
52. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION  
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 706, DATA PROCESSING—ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 706-1 (2005),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc706/defs706.pdf. 
 This is a generic class for artificial intelligence type computers and digital data 
processing systems and corresponding data processing methods and products for 
emulation of intelligence (i.e., knowledge based systems, reasoning systems, and 
knowledge acquisition systems); and including systems for reasoning with 
uncertainty (e.g., fuzzy logic systems), adaptive systems, machine learning systems, 
and artificial neural networks. 
Id. 
53. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001,  
CLASS 706, DP:  ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (DATA PROCESSING),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/706_tor.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). 
54. See id. 
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3. Extensive Corporate Ownership—Highly Concentrated 
A third set of technology classes had corporate patent ownership 
patterns reflecting large percentages of corporate ownership 
concentrated in a few organizations.  This type of patent ownership—
probably indicating the need for extensive resources and accumulated 
expertise to support advances—was present from 1997 through 2001 for 
patents falling under the semiconductor device manufacturing process, 
electrical connector, telecommunications, cleaning compounds, and 
software development, installation, and management invention classes. 
For inventions involving semiconductor device manufacturing 
processes,55 corporate patent owners received 98.6% of the 16,541 utility 
patents issued from 1997 through 2001.56  Individuals received almost 
none of these patents, accumulating only 1.4% of the patents in this 
class over this period.57  Within the corporate owner group, ownership 
was highly concentrated among a few large owners.  The top ten 
corporate patent owners accounted for 48.7% of the patents in this 
class.58 
In the area of electrical connectors,59 the level of corporate patent 
 
55. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION  
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 438, SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICE MANUFACTURING  438-1 (2005),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc438/defs438.pdf. 
 A.  This class provides for manufacturing a semiconductor containing a solid- 
state device by a combination of operations wherein: 
 (1)  no other class provides for the overall combination, and 
 (2)  the intent is to use the electrical properties of the semiconductor in the  
device for at least one of the following purposes:  (a) conducting or modifying an 
electrical current, (b) storing electrical energy for subsequent discharge within a 
microelectronic integrated circuit, or (c) converting electromagnetic wave energy to 
electrical energy or electrical energy to electromagnetic energy. 
Id. 
56. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 438,  
SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICE MANUFACTURING:  PROCESS,  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/438_tor.htm (last visited Dec. 14,  
2002). 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION  
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 439, ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS 439-1 (2004),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc439/defs439.pdf. 
 This is the generic class for a pair of mated conductors comprising at least two 
electrically conducting elements which are interconnected to permit relative motion 
of such conducting elements during use without a break in electrical conductivity 
there between (see Subclass References to the Current Class, below). 
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ownership was nearly as high as the area of semiconductor device 
manufacturing processes with corporations obtaining 88.1% of all such 
patents from 1997 through 2001 and individuals controlling the 
remaining 11.9%.60  The corporate ownership was again highly 
concentrated, with the top ten corporate patent recipients gaining 
51.7% of all patents in the class over this period.61 
Telecommunications patents62 were received in a similar pattern 
from 1997 through 2001.  Corporations received 95.3% of all such 
patents and individuals received the remaining 4.7%.63  One owner, 
 
 Also, this is the generic class for a device constituting an electricity conducting 
contact between conductors of electricity; wherein the joint is of a type which may 
be readily made and broken, repeatedly by attachment and detachment of contact 
supporting structure on each conductor. 
 (1) Note.  A soldered joint or joint formed by twisting together a pair of  
conductors and any of various other splices that is more or less permanent in nature 
is not generally provided for in this class.  See the reference to Class 174 below for 
location of a device relating to such a splice joint. Also, see below for the scope of 
this class with regard to general utility and the lines with respect to other classes 
providing for a joint, per se. 
 (2) Note.  Included under this class definition is a device known in the art as a  
contact plug, an outlet receptacle, a lamp socket, a vacuum tube socket, a 
connection block, a cable terminal, a cable joint, a binding post, a cube tap, a 
grounding strap, etc. 
 (3) Note.  This class also includes a device specialized for use with an electrical  
connector and not elsewhere classifiable.  Such a device may be, for example, any of 
certain types of mounting or supporting means, a locking device, a shield or cover, a 
strain relieving device, etc. 
Id. 
60. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 439, ELECTRICAL 
CONNECTORS, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/439_tor.htm (last  
visited Dec. 14, 2002). 
61. See id. 
62. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION  
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 455, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 455-1 (2005),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc455/defs455.pdf. 
 This is the generic class for modulated carrier wave communications not 
elsewhere classifiable. 
 Some art areas excluded from this class are:  Alternating or pulsating current 
telegraphy; Antennas; Broadcast or multiplex stereo; Condition responsive 
indicating systems with a radio coupling link; Directive carrier wave systems; 
Multiplex carrier wave communications; Paging via modulated carrier wave; Pulse 
or digital communications which may be modulated onto a carrier wave; Reflected 
carrier wave systems (e.g., radar); Selective (e.g., remote control); Telemarketing; 
Television; Facsimile. 
Id. 
63. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
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Motorola, Inc., accounted for 12.6% of all patents in this class.64  As a 
group, the top ten corporate patent owners accounted for 55.7% of all 
patents in this class.65 
In a chemical context, the patents for cleaning compositions issued 
from 1997 through 2001 also showed high levels of corporate patent 
ownership and concentration of this ownership among a few large 
corporations.66  The percentage of corporate ownership was 93.1% for 
this class, with individual ownership at only 6.9%.67  Corporate 
ownership was even more concentrated than for the other patent classes 
analyzed here.  The top ten corporate patent owners received 64.5% of 
 
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 455,  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS,http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/455_tor.htm 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2002). 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION  
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 510, CLEANING COMPOSITIONS FOR SOLID SURFACES, AUXILIARY 
COMPOSITIONS THEREFOR, OR PROCESSES OF PREPARING THE COMPOSITIONS 510-1 
(2003), http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc510/defs510.pdf. 
 This class includes the following subject matter, not provided for elsewhere, 
when a utility set forth below is either (a) claimed or (b) solely disclosed. 
 (A) CLEANING COMPOSITIONS FOR SOLID SURFACES which are  
specialized and designed for, or peculiar to, use in cleaning or removing foreign 
matter from solid surfaces. 
 (B) AUXILIARY COMPOSITIONS, PER SE, for perfecting the cleaning  
compositions of this class or for perfecting a cleaning process (e.g. rinse- or dryer-
added fabric softener compositions, etc.) for which there is no provision elsewhere. 
 (C) COMPOSITIONS OF THIS CLASS DEFINED IN TERMS OF  
SPECIFIC PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (E.G., TABLET, COATED PARTICLE, 
ETC.) – The lines generally prevailing between the composition classes and the 
article classes are applicable to Class 510 unless otherwise indicated, with the 
exception that Class 510 provides for a composition, per se, defined in terms of 
specific structure, having a utility for Class 510. 
 (D) PACKAGES of compositions of this class, or other articles which  
releasably enclose or support such compositions, for which there is no provision 
elsewhere. 
 (E) PROCESSES OF PREPARING subject matter of A–D not provided for  
elsewhere. 
Id. 
67. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 510,  
CLEANING COMPOSITIONS FOR SOLID SURFACES, AUXILIARY COMPOSITIONS  
THEREFOR, OR PROCESSES OF PREPARING THE COMPOSITIONS,  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/510_tor.htm (last visited Oct. 17,  
2002). 
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patents in this class.68 
Patents for software development, installation, and management 
advances exhibited a similar ownership pattern.69  Corporations owned 
96.1% of the patents for this technology class.70  Individual owners 
received only 3.9% of new patents in this class.  The concentration of 
patent ownership was particularly high, with the top ten patent 
recipients gaining 70.6% of patents. 71 
The highly concentrated pattern of corporate patent ownership in 
these areas suggests that advantages related to large corporate size or 
the scale of innovative efforts were important in these settings.  
Certainly, the technological resources needed to engage in research are 
large in many of these areas, effectively precluding independent 
research by individuals.  It may also be the case that personnel working 
for large companies that manufacture products or provide services in 
these areas encounter or learn of design flaws in existing products and 
services to a greater extent than individuals acting alone, with the result 
that personnel in these corporations are better informed about the goals 
of innovation to improve the products or services.  Alternatively, large 
 
68. See id. 
69. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION  
DEFINITIONS, CLASS 717, DATA PROCESSING:  SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, INSTALLATION  
AND MANAGEMENT 717-1 (2005),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc717/defs717.pdf. 
This class provides for software program development tool and techniques including 
processes and apparatus for controlling data processing operations pertaining to the 
development, maintenance, and installation of software programs.  Such processes 
and apparatus include: 
 A.  Processes and apparatus for program development functions such as  
specification, design, generation, and version management of source code programs. 
 B.  Processes and apparatus for debugging of computer program including  
monitoring, simulation, emulation, and profiling of software programs. 
 C.  Processes and apparatus for translating or compiling programs from a high- 
level representation to an intermediate code representation and finally into an 
object or machine code representation, including linking, and optimizing the 
program for subsequent execution. 
 D.  Processes and apparatus for updating, installing, and version management  
of developed code. 
Id. 
70. See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY  
TECHNOLOGY CLASS, BREAKOUT BY ORGANIZATION, 1997–2001, CLASS 717, DP:   
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, INSTALLATION, AND MANAGEMENT (DATA PROCESSING),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/tecasg/717_tor.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 
2002). 
71. See id. 
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companies in these fields may find a stream of related patents to be 
advantageous in other respects, such as serving as a continuing shield to 
isolate company activities from competitive pressures or as bargaining 
chips in efforts to gain cross-licenses concerning key technologies 
controlled by other companies.  Whether motivated by surrounding 
business factors or the technological demands of research in these 
settings, innovation by large-scale corporate innovators seems to 
predominate in the five fields described here.  In these fields, corporate 
patent ownership was extremely high and individual research and the 
promotion of patentable innovations by individuals does not seem to be 
a realistic patent law goal.  Rather, effective innovation in these fields 
seems to depend on the incentives and rewards that patents provide to 
corporations as they pursue and fund their research in these resource-
intensive fields and develop and market related products and services. 
In these settings—and in the technological contexts described earlier 
in which numerous small companies are active innovators—the 
encouragement of effective and efficient means to bring new 
innovations to the public will be furthered by strengthening the role of 
patents in promoting corporate efforts to pursue innovation by groups 
of inventors and to apply large-scale resources to these tasks.  These 
same ends will also be furthered by creating supporting corporate law 
standards that will aid in the funding and completion of these 
innovation efforts.  The remainder of this Article examines how patents 
may influence innovation by corporate organizations and suggests some 
changes in patent and corporate laws that might better encourage 
innovation in corporate contexts. 
II. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF CORPORATE INNOVATORS 
Several features make corporations different sorts of innovators 
than individuals and may require adjustments in patent and corporate 
laws to fully support corporate innovation.  The key features of 
corporate innovators that distinguish them from individual innovators 
acting outside corporate environments include the following: 
(1)  The tendency of corporate organizations to pursue technological 
discoveries and the development of related new products through group 
action; 
(2)  The ability of corporate organizations to gather, organize, and 
apply resources to innovation on a superhuman scale; 
(3)  The need for collective funding of corporate innovators—often 
from remote investors having little direct contact with the 
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corporations—in order to support large-scale innovation and related 
manufacturing and marketing programs; and 
(4)  The obligations of company owners and managers to share 
aspects of control over corporate innovation as dictated by corporate 
governance processes. 
 This section describes these distinctive qualities of corporate 
innovators.  The next section assesses how these distinctive qualities 
relate to patent incentives and related features of corporate laws 
supporting innovation. 
A. Introduction 
As described by noted economist John Kenneth Galbraith, the 
purpose of a corporation is “to do business as would an individual but 
with the added ability to assemble and use the capital of several or 
numerous persons.  In consequence, it can undertake tasks beyond the 
financial reach of any single person.”72 
When corporations initiate technological innovation efforts—as 
opposed to acquiring rights in fully developed technological devices or 
processes discovered and perfected by others73—Galbraith’s brief 
description identifies many of the distinctive attributes that distinguish 
corporate innovators from individual actors.  First, corporate behavior 
in pursuit of innovation has a superficial resemblance to individual 
behavior; that is, corporate actions in pursuit of innovation follow 
patterns that track the actions of rational individuals.  In this respect, 
organizational innovation by corporations can roughly be understood by 
thinking of corporate innovation as individual innovation writ large.  
Corporations, like individual innovators, use rational means to analyze 
consumer problems that might be suitable for technological solutions 
(typically through marketing studies or evaluations of consumer 
products in the corporations’ existing field of interest), seek such 
solutions though rationally directed and limited research, and transform 
their discoveries into perfected, manufactured, and marketed products 
 
72. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 75 (4th ed. 1985). 
73. As used here, “innovation” refers to the discovery of a technological advance 
combined with the product development, perfection, and implementation steps necessary to 
bring the new technology into public usage.  Innovation can occur through original work at 
any stage of this process.  Patents can influence each of these stages.  The promise of patents 
can encourage the pursuit of new technological discoveries with identifiable utility.  Existing 
patents (or anticipated patents) can encourage innovation at the later stages of product 
perfection, manufacturing, and marketing by improving the effectiveness or reducing the cost 
of an exclusively marketed patented product. 
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through the rational allocations of appropriate resources, often in 
competition with other internal demands for the use of the same 
resources. 
Corporations frequently create their own internal systems 
resembling markets for the allocation of resources to potential 
corporate tasks,74 meaning that they incorporate their own pressures 
which tend to limit product research and development activities to only 
those efforts that seem rational and efficient in light of the likely degree 
of public interest and commercial return of resulting corporate products 
and services.75  Because of these ongoing pressures stemming from the 
looming attraction of alternative uses of corporate resources and the 
need for corporate managers to continuously turn away from those 
alternative uses to keep supporting successive steps of corporate 
innovation, the scope of corporate efforts aimed at innovation may be 
particularly fine-tuned, rationally directed, and scaled in ways that cause 
them to be highly efficient.  In short, corporate innovators may be, in 
effect, exceptionally efficient substitutes for individual innovators, not 
just large-scale counterparts to individual innovators. 
However, it is easy to make too much of the analogy of corporations 
to individual innovators and to think that patents and other incentives 
for innovation will have similar impacts on corporations and individuals.  
There are major differences in the actions, resources, financing, and 
 
74. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1225 (1984) 
(observing that the tendency of modern corporations to operate in discrete divisions or 
operating units aids corporate management in monitoring the success of discrete corporate 
activities and in allocating resources among those internal activities with the greatest 
potential returns; in effect, such a multi-divisional corporation becomes a miniature capital 
market in which internal investment in future corporate activities is allocated in accordance 
with perceived potential for investment return). 
75. The availability of patent rights for certain types of technological developments 
may cause corporations to affirmatively pursue such developments at the expense of efforts 
to advance technologies that are less likely to produce proprietary interests and associated 
opportunities for commercialization.  This type of choice undertaken internally as corporate 
managers allocate product research and development resources was described by one 
observer as follows: 
[I]f the area is wide open for exploitation, the intellectual property strategy may 
show the potential for numerous patentable inventions that in turn will require a 
team of researchers.  On the other hand, if there is limited opportunity for 
proprietary development, then perhaps very few or no technical resources should be 
devoted to that product, or those resources should be geared to buying or licensing 
the technology. 
H. Jackson Knight, Intellectual Property “101”:  What Executives and Investors Need to Know 
About Patent Rights and Strategy, in FROM IDEAS TO ASSETS:  INVESTING WISELY IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3, 22 (Bruce Berman ed., 2002). 
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governance of corporations that make them significantly different types 
of innovators from individuals.  These differences are described in the 
remainder of this section. 
Corporations differ from individuals in ways that make corporations 
both better and worse innovators than individuals in certain respects.  
First, corporations innovate through group conduct rather than through 
the isolated actions of one inventor or a small group of inventors acting 
as individuals.76  Corporate innovation is consequently subject to the 
strengths and weaknesses of group action.  Second, corporate 
innovation often benefits in critical ways from the organization and 
application of superhuman resources to innovative tasks.77  When these 
superhuman resources are organized and applied effectively, corporate 
innovators acting with collective resources have the ability to make 
discoveries and advance technological knowledge in various ways that 
are beyond the reach of any individual.  Third, the generation and 
application of capital from backers (ranging from a relatively small, 
directly contacted group of investors at the outset of a corporate 
innovator’s existence to a widely distributed, loosely engaged set of 
investors in a publicly traded corporate innovator) is an ongoing feature 
of corporate innovation and a source of related performance pressures.78  
Fourth, corporate managers and employees seeking innovations are 
accountable to corporate shareholders and must share with investors 
through corporate governance processes some degree of management 
information and control over corporate innovation.79  These distinctive 
aspects of corporate innovation are examined in this section as they 
relate to the potential influence of patent rights and incentives. 
B. Group Action 
1. How Group Action Influences Corporate Innovation 
Under the leadership of corporate managers who translate their own 
visions of corporate goals into corporate actions, corporations tend to 
pursue technological innovation through rationally constructed means 
of gaining access to and implementing technologies that promote the 
corporations’ business interests.80  Not every company leader sees 
 
76. See infra Part II.B. 
77. See infra Part II.C. 
78. See infra Part II.D. 
79. See infra Part II.E. 
80. Corporations may seek to advance their interests through a number of strategies 
GRUNER ARTICLE - FORMATTED 4/24/2006  6:49:31 AM 
2006] CORPORATE PATENTS 27 
 
technological innovation as the best means to business success.  The 
development of new technologies is only one of several competing 
strategies that a company may use to advance its business interests.  
Alternatives to technological innovation include adopting a business 
strategy that emphasizes the increasingly efficient use of old 
technologies, the marketing of carefully improved products based on old 
technologies, or the expansion of commercial success based on product 
image rather than product performance.  Even if a company wishes to 
adopt new technologies in its practices or products, it can often just use 
new technologies that are not legally restricted or obtain the rights to 
use restricted technologies by licensing innovations produced by others, 
by acquiring the patents controlling these innovations, or by acquiring 
ownership of the companies that control the innovations. 
Despite the availability of these sorts of alternative strategies, many 
companies maintain at least some component of internal innovation 
regarding their products and practices.  While efforts to innovate in 
internal operating practices generally involve similar steps, the 
discussion here will focus on steps that companies take to develop new 
technologies for inclusion in products or services offered to customers. 
In developing and implementing new technologies to improve 
products and services, group efforts may come into play at several stages 
of corporate operations.  Specifically, group efforts may alter and 
enhance innovative activities in corporations at any or all of the 
following stages of innovation:  (1) identifying consumer needs that are 
unmet or poorly met by current technologies, (2) experimenting with 
technological solutions to these needs, (3) testing the resulting invention 
designs, (4) developing and perfecting resulting products and services, 
and (5) commercializing these products or services by implementing 
necessary manufacturing and marketing programs.81 
 
based on the development of new intellectual property.  For example, using a technology-
based strategy, a company may seek to develop advances in a particular sub-domain of 
technology with the hope that the company’s control over that aspect of technology will help 
it to create and market a series of related products over time.  Under an alternative product-
based strategy, a company may seek to develop protectable product features that will allow 
the company to maintain exclusive marketing advantages concerning a product or product 
line.  Under a third, invention-based strategy, a company developing a particular engineering 
breakthrough, which is a distinctive departure from earlier engineering approaches to the 
same design problem, may seek to control product implementations based on that new 
approach even if the commercial significance and means of exploiting the new approach are 
not yet fully apparent.  See Knight, supra note 75, at 14–17. 
81. See generally JOLLY, supra note 27, at 2–3.  A corporation need not engage in 
group actions in all of these areas for the considerations addressed here to arise.  It is 
sufficient that at least one of these types of functions is undertaken through group activity.  
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In short, by operating within a corporate infrastructure and applying 
corporate resources, working groups within corporate organizations can 
pursue a variety of key innovative tasks, often through means and with 
results that would be impossible for an individual innovator to attain.  
However, in applying group activities to innovative tasks in corporate 
organizations, employee groups are subject to several operational 
strengths and weaknesses that are endemic to group action in business 
settings.82 
2. Potential Benefits of Group Action for Technological Innovation 
Innovation conducted through group efforts within corporate 
organizations may produce useful advances in the discovery, 
development, and popularization of patented inventions.  The benefits 
of working through groups of corporate employees and with large-scale 
 
Furthermore, it is not necessary that all of these steps be taken by one company.  In many 
instances, for example, a small company or individual acts as the initial innovator, makes an 
invention, and transfers the resulting patent and technological know-how to a larger 
company.  Up to this point, the process of innovation may have been undertaken by either 
one individual or a very small group.  However, subsequent steps in the process of bringing 
the technology involved to the public in the form of widely available products or services may 
be undertaken through group action within the large corporation that eventually controls the 
patent and the technology.  As of this point in the process, the group action considerations 
addressed here become relevant. 
82. An agency process is present whenever one party is called upon to act on behalf of 
another.  For a complete treatment of the features of agency processes, see Kenneth J. 
Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:  THE STRUCTURE OF 
BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).  In these types of settings, 
the effectiveness of three types of features will determine the efficiency and success of an 
agency process in achieving results desired by a principal:  (1) mechanisms for defining the 
conduct desired by the principal, (2) mechanisms for monitoring whether that conduct is 
being undertaken by the agent, and (3) mechanisms for tying the agent’s performance 
rewards to the completion of the desired conduct.  See id. 
 All agency processes are subject to certain costs.  Agents “seldom work for free, they 
require continuing supervision, and, worst of all, they often serve themselves at the expense 
of their principals.”  Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through 
Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1638 (1999).  Typical costs of accomplishing tasks 
through agency relationships include (1) expenditures by principals to monitor the actions of 
agents, (2) bonding expenditures by agents to engender trust by principals, and (3) the 
residual losses due to divergences of agents’ conduct from the actions desired by principals.  
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
[In general,] [a]gency . . . involves an important tradeoff.  While it allows us to 
accomplish more things more cheaply, it carries its own costs and dangers, 
particularly the risk that our agents will shirk and work against our interests in 
pursuing their own.  Our goal, then, should be to maximize the benefits of agency 
while minimizing its costs. 
Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra, at 1638–39. 
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corporate assets may be realized in many stages of the innovation 
process from problem definition efforts, through invention discovery 
steps, to product introduction and popularization stages. 
In identifying and understanding problems with existing products or 
services, groups of persons working for companies may use their 
collective expertise, experience, or information sources to identify 
consumer needs, marketing opportunities, and technical capabilities that 
suggest invention potential.  By effectively combining their talents, 
knowledge, and command over resources, groups of employees within 
corporations can identify opportunities for innovation in existing 
consumer products or settings over a broader range of circumstances 
than individuals could identify. 
Once research is under way, corporations can sometimes use 
resource planning and large-scale capital funding to apply physical 
resources and research staffs on scales that make possible types of 
scientific and engineering research that would be simply impossible for 
an individual to fund or carry out. 
Similarly, once a new technology has been discovered, groups of 
developers and marketers within corporations may be able to bring 
together information about customers’ activities and desires in 
specifying particular product and service features based on the new 
technology.  Somewhat differently composed groups of corporate 
employees will also have the types of collective information needed to 
effectively and efficiently design and implement the initial 
manufacturing and marketing programs for newly designed products. 
In each of these settings, the strengths of group information 
collection, analysis, and effort can be brought to bear to produce better 
evaluations and actions than would be possible through the capabilities 
of one individual.  While these sorts of group efforts certainly require 
coordination to be effective and will involve some special costs in this 
regard, the net benefits of group action in these areas can be 
considerable.  When group action can draw upon the accumulated 
experience of multiple corporate employees with past products and 
product-related corporate systems, such efforts can produce new 
product designs that avoid past product errors, that build on corporate 
production and marketing strengths, and that utilize the collective 
knowledge of corporate personnel about their industry and customer 
preferences to the public’s benefit. 
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3. Potential Weaknesses of Group Action for Technological 
Innovation 
Unfortunately, group efforts may also introduce errors or 
inefficiencies into innovative processes.  These problems can stem from 
difficulties in motivation, coordination, and information handling arising 
in group processes. 
In order to be motivated to diligently pursue corporate interests in 
carrying out innovative efforts, persons working in groups of corporate 
employees must have some personal reason or motivation to seek 
innovations that will serve corporate interests.  In some instances, this 
type of motivational alignment—in which the interests of individuals are 
aligned with their corporate employer’s interests in innovation—can be 
achieved through promises of salary increases or promotional 
opportunities that are tied to success in innovation.  Under these 
arrangements, successes in corporate innovation produce increased 
individual salaries or promotions, thereby tying individual researchers’ 
interests and motivations to corporate interests. 
The patents arising out of corporate employees’ discoveries are 
typically required by employment contracts to be assigned to the 
inventors’ corporate employers.  Hence, there is typically little or no 
incremental compensation for producing patentable inventions and 
transferring related patents per se.  However, individual employees 
must still be given incentives to seek patentable inventions for the 
benefit of their employers even though the employees will not own the 
patents themselves and may gain no direct benefit from the enforcement 
of those patents.  To encourage efforts to discover patentable inventions 
and to seek related patents, companies frequently promise bonuses for 
the completion of patent applications or payments to individual 
inventors of percentages of later licensing royalties derived from patents 
stemming from the employees’ discoveries.83 
 
83. Bonuses are a common means to encourage employees to disclose inventions to 
their employers or to complete the paper work necessary to obtain a patent: 
 Typically, bonus awards are given to inventors to encourage disclosures.  These 
may be progressive in size, depending on the disposition of the idea.  For example, a 
$100 bonus may be given upon submission of the disclosure statement, $500 to 
$1,000 upon approval of filing a patent application based on the idea, and $1,000 to 
$2,000 upon actual filing.  In the event a patent of significant value issues, an 
additional substantial bonus may be granted at the patent committee’s discretion.  
The CEO should announce this bonus award policy and personally deliver the 
message that the quality and quantity of the ideas submitted will be taken into 
consideration during each employee’s evaluation. 
Leo R. Reynolds, Intellectual Property Assets, in STARTING UP AND ADVISING AN 
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While these motivational measures are helpful, they may still not 
adequately align corporate employees’ efforts regarding patentable 
inventions to the interests of their corporate employers.  Corporate 
employees may undertake significantly weaker efforts to make 
patentable discoveries than would be the case if they would own the 
resulting patents because their corporate employer, and not they, will 
reap most of the benefits from the patents.  In these circumstances, 
where employees may be satisfied with their guaranteed salaries and not 
greatly concerned about incremental bonuses or highly contingent 
payments of future royalty percentages for making patentable 
inventions, the motivations of individual employees will not conform to 
those of their corporations and corporate interests in patentable 
inventions will not be fully served. 
Alternatively, corporate incentive systems concerning patentable 
inventions may over-encourage the pursuit of such inventions.  When 
the seeking and obtaining of a patent becomes an end in itself, 
corporate employees may pursue any sort of patentable discovery even 
when the invention being sought does not have significant economic 
potential as the basis for commercial products or services.  In such 
circumstances, incentives to create patentable inventions, such as salary 
bonuses for such inventions or related patent applications, may 
encourage inefficient efforts to pursue patents, leading to discoveries 
when there is either no net benefit to the corporation involved or even if 
there is some net benefit, the benefit is less than the corporate gains that 
might have been realized had the same resources been devoted to other 
profit-making activities. 
Coordination problems may also plague efforts to produce corporate 
innovations through group efforts.  In innovative efforts, as with other 
group activities in corporate enterprises, multiple employees require 
coordination in order to work effectively towards a common goal.  This 
type of coordination becomes a significant burden as groups become 
large.  When this sort of coordination is done poorly, it may also be a 
source of great inefficiency and waste in corporate innovation programs. 
Even when efforts of multiple parties are properly coordinated to 
pursue innovative goals, gaps in the communication of critical 
information among multiple innovators may cripple the effectiveness of 
their efforts.  Particularly when the successful completion of tasks by 
one group member depends on prior steps being performed by another 
member, accurate and complete communication between such parties is 
 
EMERGING MASSACHUSETTS BUSINESS 4-1, 4-14 (Lawrence H. Gennari ed., 2001). 
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often essential for effective group action. 
C. Extensive Resources 
Corporate efforts to discover and to perfect useful inventions 
sometimes also differ from individual efforts in the size and nature of 
the resources that corporations can apply to innovative tasks.  
Corporations can apply extensive resources to innovative programs, in 
part, because investor backing gives the corporations the funding to 
acquire these resources.  Also, if a company is pursuing multiple 
research projects in a given technological domain, the costs of particular 
equipment or personnel can be spread across the multiple projects in a 
way that no individual innovator would be capable of doing.  In short, 
corporations frequently have access to more resources supporting 
innovation and, through careful planning, can make better use of the 
resources they have. 
Corporations with expensive equipment or other types of costly 
research infrastructures may have sole access to certain research 
domains.  In many fields in which the study of new technologies requires 
the application and coordination of extensive, complex resources and 
the actions of numerous personnel, corporate innovation is the only 
innovation.  It is unlikely, for example, that an individual inventor could 
marshal the resources and supporting personnel needed to make 
substantial advances in integrated circuit designs.  In short, corporate 
efforts to advance technology through group efforts and the extensive 
application of capital gained from multiple investors is the only viable 
path of technological advance in these sorts of complex, resource 
intensive domains.  In such settings, the impact of patent and corporate 
law standards on corporate incentives and affairs are particularly 
important:  if these standards are not successful in encouraging advances 
or impede the discovery or popularization of advances in some way, 
there are no alternative channels of individual innovation that patents 
can encourage as a means of achieving equivalent public gains from the 
technology involved. 
In some industries and innovative settings, the resources required 
for innovation and the group actions needed to complete it are so 
substantial that only large corporations are sufficient to initiate and to 
conduct effective innovation.  For example, in the pharmaceutical 
industry, the equipment and testing procedures needed to develop new 
drugs are enormous; thus, only innovative effort conducted on a large 
corporate scale is likely to be effective in producing new product 
designs.  In these contexts, innovation is, by virtue of the nature of the 
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innovative processes and resources needed, concentrated in the 
operations of a few giant corporations. 
D. Capital Needs 
The need to obtain capital in order to facilitate large-scale 
innovation efforts and to keep the support of existing investors over the 
course of innovation programs is a source of ongoing pressure on 
corporate innovators.  This pressure stems from requirements—
privately imposed by individual investors in small companies and 
statutorily imposed in large companies that are publicly traded—of 
disclosures and reports to potential and existing investors about the 
nature and expected business value of various innovative programs and 
technological discoveries.  The need for capital may also encourage 
inefficient efforts to hurry innovative products into production in order 
to realize profits at the earliest possible time and thereby generate more 
capital or placate existing investors. 
The need for capital in conducting research programs and 
developing products from the resulting discoveries is not peculiar to 
patented inventions, but will apply when any type of product or process 
innovation is pursued through corporate enterprises.  However, the 
association of patent interests with promising technologies allows a 
relatively concrete value to be attached to those technologies at an early 
stage in the development of related products and marketing programs.  
By giving corporate managers a set of patent assets and exclusive 
marketing opportunities to point to in fundraising activities, patents on 
key technologies can entice investor interest in the funding of further 
rounds of activities that are needed to transform an unproven new 
technology into specific product designs, to establish manufacturing 
programs for the resulting products, and to undertake the initial 
marketing efforts needed to popularize those products. 
Corporate ownership of patents permits the ownership interests of 
persons providing financing of product, manufacturing, and marketing 
development efforts to be combined in convenient ways with prior 
corporate ownership interests given to technology discoverers in 
exchange for an assignment of their patents and to an initial corporate 
management team.  Investors bringing critical new money into a 
company that is developing a new technology can simply be given stock 
in a sufficient ownership percentage to reflect the degree of risk being 
taken by the new investors.  This percentage will typically reflect the 
scope of interest that the venture capitalists or other investors involved 
feel is necessary to ensure that, when the company is successful and sold 
GRUNER ARTICLE - FORMATTED 4/24/2006  6:49:31 AM 
34  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
 
at a later point, the investors’ likely share of the resulting proceeds will 
represent a return on their initial investment at a rate that justifies the 
risks that they are taking in investing in an untried technology, and 
typically, an untried company.84 
E. Governance Influences 
In carrying out innovative efforts with funding provided by multiple 
investors, corporations sacrifice some of the control that they would 
otherwise have over the course of innovative efforts.85  Corporate laws 
do not generally allow shareholders to take over the day-to-day 
management of the companies that they own, reserving the final say on 
day-to-day corporate matters to the boards of directors and senior 
executives of each company.86  However, corporate laws regarding the 
internal control or “governance” of corporations specify several features 
of corporate operations that limit the freedom of choice of senior 
executives and that help shareholders to hold these executives 
accountable for their management decisions.87  In extreme cases, 
 
84. See Tom Smith, A Venture Capital Analysis,  
http://www.morebusiness.com/running_your_business/financing/vent-cap.brc#value (last  
visited Oct. 8, 2005).  Typically, venture capitalists “seek to earn between 5 and 10 times their 
initial investment within a 5–8 year [period of expected investment].”  Id. 
85. Corporate and securities laws require companies to adopt governance processes 
under which shareholders possess powers to select or change the members of a company’s 
board of directors.  Company managers are, at least formally, accountable to the board 
members whom the shareholders select.  Not only do corporate and securities laws impose 
substantive checks on management action through these governance mechanisms but also 
generally require that corporate managers disclose accurate information to shareholders 
about the status of corporate affairs.  These accountability and information disclosure 
obligations limit the absolute control of managers over corporate affairs in ways that are 
designed to reassure shareholders and to limit the risks shareholders face in entrusting 
investments to companies. 
86. See, e.g., 18B AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1290 (2004) (“The directors of a 
corporation are its executive representatives charged with the administration of its internal 
affairs and the management and use of its assets.”). 
87. Corporate governance mechanisms place a number of structural limitations on 
important activities undertaken by corporate managers, such as efforts to obtain and to 
enforce patents.  The primary process for accomplishing this is a hierarchy of accountability 
of corporate managers to superiors and of senior executives to corporate board members.  In 
addition, corporate governance processes typically produce ongoing disclosures to 
shareholders about performance by top managers in material areas, such as patent 
management and enforcement, thereby aiding shareholders in taking that performance into 
account in shareholder voting.  Corporate boards serve what Ira Millstein has described as a 
“certifying” function in evaluating the performance of senior managers and reporting on or 
“certifying” the quality of that performance in disclosures to shareholders.  Ira M. Millstein, 
The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW. 1485, 1493–94 (1993).  He concludes 
that this certifying process has positive impacts in both limiting management conduct and 
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corporate governance processes can force changes in corporate 
management or shifts in corporate ownership to new parties who 
demand changes in management and business directions.88 
The need for periodic information reporting to shareholders and the 
need to adhere to shareholder decision processes that hold senior 
managers accountable for corporate performance sometimes constitute 
indirect limitations on the course of corporate innovation efforts and 
distinguish those efforts from individual endeavors to pursue and 
popularize inventions.  Shared control held by corporate shareholders 
and managers can lead to background struggles that hinder the course 
of innovative efforts or, at least, make innovation efforts inefficient and 
unnecessarily costly.  However, the threat of being held accountable and 
potentially removed by shareholders looms over senior executives and 
creates incentives for attention to corporate and shareholder interests 
that may encourage careful attention to the development and 
popularization of patented technologies and related products.  Hence, 
while the present system of partial shareholder control over corporate 
activities and innovative efforts may sometimes detract from the 
singular vision and focused pursuit of innovative programs in corporate 
settings, no generally effective substitute for aligning the interests of 
 
communicating positive management performance features to shareholders: 
The process of corporate governance will never become, nor should it be, free of 
tension.  There should be constructive tension between shareholders and boards, 
and between boards and managers.  This does not mean bullhorns, coercion, threats, 
and hostility.  Such means are out of place absent a total unwillingness by boards 
and managers to respond.  But it does mean accountability.  Neither boards nor 
shareholders should ever cease to be vigilant over their respective charges. 
 A “certifying board” provides that accountability mechanism—accountability 
of the board to the shareholders, and of managers to the board.  And it is a good 
prescription for all, including the managers.  An independent credible board is not 
just good for the corporation and its shareholders; a credible board can be 
management’s greatest ally.  It can certify to shareholders in times of trouble that 
management is pursuing the appropriate course. 
Id. 
88. Persons willing to acquire a substantial percentage of the stock of a company can 
sometimes mount a corporate takeover and force a change in corporate managers.  Indeed, 
the threat of such a change can cause corporate managers to be highly attentive to keeping 
corporate performance levels and stock prices high in order to curb shareholder enthusiasm 
for sales of stock to persons potentially mounting a takeover attempt.  In this respect, the 
threat of a takeover can substitute for direct shareholder monitoring in encouraging 
corporate managers to pursue profitable corporate performance.  With respect to patent 
interests, this suggests that corporate managers will have ongoing reasons to maximize patent 
value even in the absence of detailed scrutiny or pressure from current shareholders.  See 
John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1016–20 (1993). 
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senior managers and shareholders has as yet been found.  Consequently, 
corporate governance limitations continue to bear on the nature of 
innovation in corporate settings and the ways that such innovation is 
influenced by corporate shareholders. 
As part of the governance processes providing shareholders with 
opportunities to hold corporate managers accountable for their 
direction of corporate innovation programs, corporate managers may be 
obligated to provide special disclosures to shareholders of material 
information about innovation programs and related patent interests.  
Senior managers will have obligations under securities laws and fraud 
standards to be complete and accurate in information provided to 
shareholders about innovation programs and patent interests.  Any 
disclosures by senior managers about patent values or enforcement risks 
that are so restricted or one-sided as to be materially misleading will 
undercut the ability of shareholders to review the performance of 
corporate managers with respect to key patents and will create a basis 
for personal liability to the shareholders of the parties making the 
incomplete or inaccurate statements.89  These requirements of accurate 
and complete disclosures are direct reflections of the economic interest 
of shareholders in the value of corporate patents and the need for 
accurate information if shareholders are to review and to evaluate how 
their company’s patent interests are being protected and 
commercialized by corporate managers. 
Corporate officers may also have duties to their corporations under 
state corporation laws concerning the ways that the officers monitor 
patent enforcement risks and respond to patent enforcement problems.  
Because they are, in effect, stewards of the shareholders’ interests, 
senior corporate managers have duties under state corporation laws to 
monitor risks to corporate patent enforcement and to resolve problems 
with such patents as they arise.90  When they fail to address known or 
 
89. Materially misleading statements about patent interests or other key corporate 
assets can form the basis for corporate and personal liability under federal securities laws.  
See Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1992); Robert A. Prentice & John H. 
Langmore, Beware of Vaporware:  Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of High-
Tech Companies, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1994). 
90. Delaware law governs the duties of corporate officers and directors in most large 
corporations because they are incorporated in that state. 
[T]he question of whether a corporate director has become liable for losses to the 
corporation through neglect of duty is determined by the circumstances.  If he has 
recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has refused 
or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored either 
willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the 
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reasonably discoverable risks regarding corporate patent ownership or 
enforcement and their corporation suffers identifiable harm as a result, 
corporate officers may be found to have breached their duties to their 
corporation and be held personally liable for the corporation’s losses.91  
Similarly, if corporate managers take actions concerning the ownership 
or enforcement of corporate patents that favor the managers at the 
expense of their corporation, the managers may be seen as having 
breached their fiduciary duties to their corporation and be held liable 
for the damage that their corporation has suffered.92  These sorts of 
 
law will cast the burden of liability upon him. 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
91. See American Bar Association, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 59 BUS. LAW. 
1057, 1069–70 (2004). 
 A director should inquire into potential problems or issues when alerted by 
circumstances or events suggesting that board attention is appropriate; for example, 
inquiry is warranted when information provided on an important matter appears 
materially inaccurate or inadequate or there is reason to question the veracity of 
management.  When directors uncover or receive from others information indicating 
that the corporation is or may be experiencing significant problems in a particular 
area of business, or may be engaging in unlawful conduct, they should make further 
inquiry and follow up until they are reasonably satisfied that management is dealing 
with the situation appropriately.  Even when there are no such “red flags,” directors 
should periodically satisfy themselves that the corporation maintains programs that 
are appropriately designed to identify and manage business risks and reasonably 
effective to maintain compliance with laws and corporate policies and procedures. 
Id. 
 Corporate directors or officers may be personally liable based on inattention to the 
mismanagement of key corporate assets like corporate patents when the directors or officers 
were aware of flaws in patents or enforcement efforts, but failed to take actions to correct the 
situation or to curb related corporate losses.  Cf. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders 
Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that, when there were repeated 
indications to corporate directors that key production activities were being undertaken 
illegally, “the directors’ decision to not act was not made in good faith and was contrary to 
the best interests of the company” and, if proven, was a breach of duty supporting personal 
liability of the directors for resulting corporate losses); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 814, 819 
(6th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of reh’g by 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
directors’ sustained failure to act against a corporation’s systematic health care fraud 
occurring from at least 1994 to 1996 alleged sufficient facts “to present a substantial 
likelihood of liability”). 
92. A corporate officer or director will breach his duty of loyalty when he promotes his 
personal interests at the expense of his corporation’s interests: 
 The duty of loyalty requires a director’s conduct to be in good faith and in the 
best interests of the corporation—and not in the director’s own interest or in the 
interest of another person (such as a family member) or an organization with which 
the director is associated.  Simply put, a director should not use the director’s 
corporate position for personal profit or gain or for other personal or noncorporate 
advantage. 
American Bar Association, supra note 91, at 1070. 
GRUNER ARTICLE - FORMATTED 4/24/2006  6:49:31 AM 
38  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
 
limitations on the potential actions of corporate managers in securing 
and enforcing patents are direct consequences of the shared ownership 
of corporations and the corresponding duties of corporate managers to 
seek and administer the ownership of patents as representatives of the 
interests of their corporations and, ultimately, of its shareholders. 
III. THE CORPORATE IMPACT OF PATENT REWARDS:  
RECONSIDERING PATENT INCENTIVES IN CORPORATE SETTINGS 
Patent rights are frequently justified based on their influence in 
promoting innovative efforts.93  Starting from this premise, analysts have 
specified several ways that patent rights might beneficially influence the 
development of new inventions or encourage related processes used to 
bring products and services based on new inventions to the public.  This 
section examines these justifications for patent rights and critiques their 
implications in light of the probable influence of patent rights on 
corporate innovation rather than individual innovation. 
A. Reward Theory 
Reward theory justifies patent rights on the ground that the 
recognition of such rights rewards an innovator for the risk and expense 
involved in producing a useful invention.94  Through the recognition of 
patent rights, an inventor obtains a temporary monopoly over the 
making, using, and selling of the patented invention.  The value of the 
temporary control over the invention depends, at least roughly, on the 
degree of increased utility provided to users by the patented invention 
and, therefore, the amount that users will pay for access to the invention 
 
93. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 247, 247 (1994). 
[In understanding the impact of patent laws,] it is important to recognize the 
primary problem that the patent system solves.  This problem—often called the 
“appropriability problem”—is that, if a firm could not recover the costs of invention 
because the resulting information were available to all, then we could expect a much 
lower and indeed suboptimal level of innovation.  In short, the patent system 
prevents others from reaping where they have not sown and thereby promotes 
research and development (R & D) investment in innovation. 
Id. 
94. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Manual of Political Economy, in 3 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 31, 71 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (noting that allowing an inventor an 
“exclusive privilege” to commercialize a patented invention is “the best proportioned, the 
most natural, and the least burthensome” means to encourage technological innovation, 
producing an infinite effect, yet costing nothing). 
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over the cost of non-patented substitutes.95 
Reward theory has developed into two variants—one weak and one 
strong.96  The weak version simply posits that patents are designed to 
reward and encourage increased efforts to produce innovations.97  
However, the mechanism by which patents further this end is not 
explained.  The analyses in this Article describing how patents facilitate 
the functions and success of corporate innovators provide several 
possible explanations of the mechanisms whereby patent rewards 
encourage socially valuable innovation and fulfill the broad purposes of 
the patent system. 
A second, strong version of reward theory suggests that patent rights 
should only be recognized when the lure of potential patent rights has 
actually influenced individual innovators.98  Such a view would limit 
patent rights to cases in which they have had a measurable impact on 
innovative conduct.  However, this approach is probably too narrow 
because it is based on too restrictive a notion of how patents may 
increase the public’s access to useful inventions.  It fails to recognize 
that, as argued in this Article, existing and potential patents can have 
beneficial impacts on the operation of innovative corporations at the 
organizational level that extend beyond the immediate development of 
new inventions.  These further impacts—such as the patent-influenced 
generation of funding for post-invention product design and perfection 
activities based on a new invention or the development and 
implementation of manufacturing and marketing programs for 
introducing products incorporating a new invention—are also valuable 
to society because they expand the range of publicly available 
innovations. 
Patents create important corporate rewards in several ways that 
encourage corporations to develop innovative products and to bring 
those products to the public.  Potential impacts of patents on innovation 
 
95. See 2 JOHN STEWART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 548–49 (5th 
ed., D. Appleton & Co. 1909) (explaining that patent rewards for useful innovations are 
preferable to a government-administered bonus system rewarding innovations because 
patents avoid discretion on the part of government officials and secure rewards to inventors 
that are proportional to the usefulness of the inventions, with the rewards being paid by the 
consumers who benefit from the inventions). 
96. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 12, at 312–13. 
97. See, e.g., WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW:  A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 33–52 (1973). 
98. See, e.g., FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 443–44 (2d ed. 1980); A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness:  
Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1989). 
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in corporate environments including the following: 
(1)  Patents can serve as the basis for corporate financing efforts that 
focus on and separately value innovation efforts, thereby bringing 
investor backing to innovators who would otherwise lack the financial 
backing and resources needed to commercialize innovative discoveries;99 
(2)  Patents and the scope of returns they promise provide a basis for 
identifying cost-justified innovation efforts and for securing investor 
funding of innovation at levels that correspond at least roughly to the 
expected public value of the inventions being sought;100 
(3)  Patents and businesses aimed at producing new, patentable 
innovations form attractive targets for risk-preferring investors, thereby 
encouraging the efficient support for innovation by giving this subclass 
of investors a relatively direct means to support high risk innovation 
efforts;101 
(4)  Patents can strengthen innovative companies by differentially 
favoring innovative companies over other companies that fail to 
innovate, thereby increasing the chances that innovators will survive and 
serve as “repeat players” that continue to produce useful advances as 
they engage in ongoing competition with less innovative companies;102 
(5)  Patents create some rewards that are peculiar to corporations by 
expanding the value of existing corporate marketing and manufacturing 
efforts;103 and 
(6)  In some settings, where uses of enormous or complex resources 
are the only ways to achieve innovation results, corporate backing opens 
the door to new ranges of effective innovation and potential public 
gains.104 
Each of these possible impacts of patent rewards in promoting 
corporate innovation is assessed in this subsection. 
1.   Separating Innovation Incentives and Rewards from Manufacturing 
and Marketing Capabilities 
In influencing corporate behavior, patents bring technological 
innovations a transferable value that is independent of particular 
manufacturing and marketing efforts, thereby making such innovations 
 
99. See infra Part III.A.1. 
100. See infra Part III.A.2. 
101. See infra Part III.A.3. 
102. See infra Part III.A.4. 
103. See infra Part III.A.5. 
104. See infra Part III.A.6. 
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more attractive targets of corporate business activities and associated 
corporate enterprises.  By allowing innovations to be valued and 
transferred, patents facilitate the separation of innovation from product 
production, marketing, and delivery.  While some companies may 
engage in both innovation and the later stages of product delivery to the 
public, this integration is not necessary.  Companies can form around an 
innovation opportunity, seeking corporate funding and organizing 
corporate activities around the most efficient and effective means to 
discover a new technology and reduce it to practice.  The technology 
can then be patented and transferred to another corporation with 
greater resources via either an assignment of the resulting patents or a 
merger of the innovating corporation into the larger corporation. 
This process makes innovation its own separate business realm, 
separating the risks and opportunities of this field from the areas of 
manufacturing and marketing.  Given that the latter may require 
enormous resources and rely on accumulated expertise in long-standing 
companies, the ability of innovators to separate out innovation efforts 
and to pursue them through financing that is sufficient to support 
innovation, but not later commercialization efforts, establishes a 
valuable business option that expands opportunities for innovation.  The 
availability of this separate channel or means of innovation expands the 
number and diversity of viable innovators beyond those relatively few 
companies that would be able to both engage in effective innovation 
and commercialize the resulting technological advances. 
2. Scaling the Scope of Innovation Efforts and Achieving Efficient 
Funding 
By attaching a value to an invention that roughly reflects the value 
of the invention in its full range of uses rather than just the use that a 
particular company or set of consumers might make of the invention, a 
patent can encourage the funding of efforts to pursue the invention up 
to the full value of the invention to the public.  Innovation expenses up 
to this level will be cost-justified because the value of resulting patent 
rights promises a payback corresponding to the increased utility of the 
invention to the public, at least during the term of the patent.  The 
promise of this payback can, in turn, be the basis for efforts to raise 
financial backing for innovation efforts from potential corporate 
shareholders.  The rough equation of patent value with consumer value 
of the related invention will encourage associated corporate efforts that 
are funded and tailored in their scope to match the probable public 
value of the resulting innovations.  In short, patents form a bridge 
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linking the estimation of cost-justified corporate funding and 
organizational effort to the public value of corporate innovations. 
3. Providing Investment Opportunities for Risk-Preferring Investors 
Businesses aimed at producing new, patentable innovations form 
attractive targets for investors seeking high-risk investments with the 
potential for a large return.  By ensuring that the initial commercial 
returns related to a particular innovation will come primarily to the 
company completing the innovation and its investors, a corporate patent 
can provide the reassurance to investors that their high-stakes “bet” 
made by investing in a high-tech start-up company will be matched by a 
return that reflects the full value of the patentable technologies that 
result.  Absent such a guarantee, investors would be worried about free 
riders appropriating the value of any technology that was developed 
with their investment dollars and would discount the potential value of 
an innovative company’s efforts accordingly. 
Indeed, because the circumstances potentially leading to 
appropriation would not be within their knowledge or control, investors 
might tend to overestimate the likelihood of appropriation of a new 
innovation by companies that paid nothing to the original innovator, 
thereby making backing of such an innovator seem even more risky 
than would be suggested by the inherent risks of failure raised by 
technology research and the high likelihood of losses stemming from 
many innovation efforts.  This combination of free rider risks layered on 
top of innovation failure risks would be likely to deter many parties and 
to significantly reduce investor interest in high-tech development 
efforts.  Patents counteract some sources of doubt about investment in 
technology innovators by giving innovators the ability to reserve the 
sole rights to commercialize a new technology to a single company, 
thereby creating a legally-backed source of predictable returns for 
investors in the company. 
4. Strengthening Innovators over Technologically Stagnant Companies 
Patents can also increase technological innovation by backing the 
efforts of companies that are “repeat players” in innovative efforts.  
Once a company assembles expertise and resources needed to innovate 
in a given field and gains experience with advanced technologies in that 
field, the company is a likely source of further advances.  Value 
returned in connection with an initial patented advance can help to fund 
further innovative efforts and strengthen the company involved in 
marketing efforts when it competes with other companies that have not 
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discovered functionally important and commercially popular 
technologies.  By establishing a source of value and economic return 
that distinguishes them from a less innovative companies, innovative 
companies can survive in periods of competition and go on to further 
rounds of innovative efforts.  To the extent that these companies possess 
personnel, expertise, or values that make them particularly adept at 
multiple rounds of innovation, the success of an initial round, as backed 
by patent rewards, can provide the basis for subsequent rounds, with 
corresponding public benefits from any positive results in the 
subsequent rounds. 
A similar argument based on maintaining active markets for the 
transfer of innovations can be made for companies that acquire a 
technology valued by the public and thereby achieve a source of income 
that allows them to survive over less innovative or less astute technology 
acquirers.  By strengthening the technologically astute companies that 
place their acquisition funds behind innovative efforts rather than 
strengthening less innovation-focused companies that might put their 
resources behind increased marketing of old products or non-innovative 
product differentiation efforts with little increase in consumer utility, 
patent rights create important opportunities for transfers of rights to 
innovations and associated means for companies using those 
innovations successfully to produce related profits, engage in further 
technology acquisitions and, ultimately, to bring more innovations to 
public attention and availability. 
5. Increasing Corporate Rewards by Complementing Existing 
Marketing Efforts 
Another reason why patents may have a distinct lure for corporate 
innovators and, hence, create unusually strong rewards and incentives 
for the pursuit of useful inventions in corporate settings is that patented 
improvements in existing products or completely new inventions in the 
same product field as a company’s previous endeavors can provide the 
means for a company to extend and improve existing marketing efforts.  
Patented improvements may allow a company to keep marketing its 
products as the best in the field, either because the products have 
greater actual utility or because they have certain distinctive and 
patented features that appeal to consumer tastes and are unavailable in 
competitors’ products. 
In these circumstances, patents correlate with marketing potential 
and value, a potential value that may be particularly large for 
corporations with preexisting stakes in a given marketing domain.  A 
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new patented innovation may be seen as having value equal to the 
perceived marketing benefits that the resulting patent rights and control 
will gain the company involved rather than value equal to the increased 
utility the invention will provide to the public.  Hence, the real rewards 
driving patent-related innovation may not be the objective value of the 
patent rights themselves, but rather the perceived marketing value of 
the rights in combination with preexisting products, marketing 
programs, and consumer perceptions of the corporation involved.  In 
short, marketing context and potential may drive innovation efforts and 
directions in some settings more than an objective assessment of the full 
scope of technology value and related patent rewards. 
These types of market-driven values associated with corporate 
patents may enhance innovation incentives in ways that benefit the 
public.  A corporation with established marketing programs may be 
well-informed about the product needs of its customers and perceive the 
value to customers of particular innovations.  Based on this information 
about consumer preferences, the corporation’s managers may place a 
much higher value on certain innovations and related patents than 
would an innovator acting in relative isolation from the relevant 
consumer and marketing information.  As more efficient and complete 
gatherers of consumer preference information than individual 
innovators, corporations initiating innovation or technology acquisition 
efforts may be particularly effective in targeting the direction and scope 
of those efforts so as to meet consumer needs.  The promise of patent 
rewards in this context becomes a means whereby corporations can 
translate existing marketing and consumer information into product 
innovation programs that match consumer needs far better than 
comparable efforts by less well-informed innovators acting outside of 
corporate organizations. 
On the other hand, market-driven rewards for patented innovations 
may direct some innovative programs away from their proper focus on 
product utility and public benefit towards a different emphasis on 
strategic corporate marketing strength and products that cater to non-
functional consumer preferences.  To the extent that the marketing 
potential of patented innovations is the driving force behind innovation 
programs in certain corporations and that marketing potential deviates 
in some way from increased utility to consumers, companies may fall 
into a pattern of innovating for product differentiation’s sake rather 
than seeking innovations with true improvements in product 
functionality or efficiency.  Whether this type of innovation is contrary 
to the public interest depends on how closely the marketing success of 
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the corporations involved correlates with improved product 
functionality provided to customers.  To the extent that product markets 
value appealing product features over functional ones, product 
development resources may be inefficiently diverted to focusing on 
producing new appealing features rather than increasingly useful ones.  
In this respect, the patent system may actually divert innovation efforts 
away from products with substantial utility and towards products with 
the modicum of utility needed to satisfy patent law standards and gain 
patents, but with a perceived value that relates mostly to the vanity or 
nonfunctional tastes of consumers. 
6. Assembling Group Action or Extensive Resources Needed for 
Innovation 
In some highly complex or resource intensive fields like 
pharmaceutical drug development or biotechnology engineering, the 
range of group actions and extensive resources needed to advance 
technological understanding effectively precludes individuals acting in 
isolation from supporting organizations from being effective innovators.  
Innovation in these settings is purely corporate because only through 
the backing and group funding of multiple investors can the types of 
resources and group actions needed to produce new innovations be 
undertaken.  There may be gradations in the size of the corporate 
entities involved.  For example, the pharmaceutical field includes a 
number of small drug companies and several “big pharm” giants, which 
are innovators in different drug areas.105  However, all of these 
companies, at their various size levels, conduct research and product 
development efforts that are far beyond the capabilities and resources 
of individual inventors. 
The need for corporate backing of research programs to accomplish 
certain types of innovation—and the enhancement of innovation 
capabilities provided by such backing even in areas in which individual 
innovation is possible—makes the processes for funding and 
administering corporate backing of research efforts critical 
considerations in the attainment of patent law goals.  Ideally, patents 
will encourage research efforts that entail the least development cost 
possible for a given invention, thereby maximizing the net societal gain 
 
105. See Dror Ben-Asher, In Need of Treatment?  Merger Control, Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 300–01 (2000) (describing the 
respective advantages of relatively small and large innovators in the pharmaceutical field). 
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from that invention.106  The public’s net benefit from the emergence and 
popular adoption of a new, patented invention is the net increase in 
total societal utility, taking into account the total increase in utility 
experienced by users of the invention, but lessened by the costs of 
developing the invention.  An invention that is developed through 
inefficient means, involving unnecessary expense in either the 
engineering studies leading to the invention or in the financing or 
corporate management steps underlying those studies, is less valuable to 
society than the same invention developed through more efficient 
means because the net gain to society from the efficiently produced 
innovation is greater. 
To the extent that the backing for a line of innovation is developed 
through inefficient or ineffective means, costs are injected into 
technology innovation programs that could be avoided and society loses 
portions of the net value of resulting innovations.  Hence, the 
effectiveness of corporate formation and investment generation 
processes for backing innovation programs are of critical importance to 
the fulfillment of patent law policies and overall social goals regarding 
technological development.  If these supporting corporate processes are 
conducted with unnecessary costs or with less than complete backing for 
available, cost-effective programs of technological development, the 
types and net value of innovations that will stem from the resulting 
corporate innovation efforts will not be optimal responses to public 
demands for new technologies. 
On the other hand, if corporate processes work effectively, they can 
be a highly valuable means to match the scope of funding and available 
engineering resources to the pursuit of various types of publicly valuable 
innovations.  By making opportunities for innovation available to small 
corporation-backed innovators that work outside of large companies, 
corporate funding through start-up companies allows innovation to stem 
from many more sources than would be the case if only large, long-
standing corporations could undertake complex, resource-intensive 
innovation programs.  Corporate funding at the start-up level takes the 
 
106. Patents allow inventors to collect a “monopoly rent” from users that is equal to 
the increased utility of a patented invention over non-patented substitutes.  This monopoly 
rent is effectively equal to the net societal gain from a patented invention as reflected in the 
incremental amount that consumers will pay for access to the invention.  When duplicate or 
otherwise wasteful invention development efforts are undertaken in the course of producing 
a patented invention, economists speak of the undesirable results as a diminishment of the 
monopoly rent from the patent or “rent dissipation.”  Ideally, the patent system and related 
legal standards, such as corporate law provisions related to the generation of funding for 
innovative programs, should be administered to minimize monopoly rent dissipation. 
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blinders of large corporate thinking off of innovation decisions and adds 
a wide array of independent corporate innovators led by individuals 
with new innovation insights to the mix of potentially effective 
innovators. 
At the same time, competition for innovation-related sources of 
funding ensure that there are constant pressures for innovators in start-
up and small companies to conduct their innovation programs in a lean, 
efficiently focused manner.  Investment generation forces in the area of 
high-tech venture funding create a form of market discipline concerning 
the scope of innovation efforts, producing pressures for effective and 
efficient action by innovators in start-up companies that should 
minimize innovation costs.  In this respect, investors—primarily venture 
capitalists in the sphere of small company-backed innovators—serve the 
interests of the patent system by keeping pressures on innovators to be 
effective, but efficient, in producing socially valuable (and highly 
commercializable) new innovations. 
B. Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory offers an alternative justification for patent rights 
that focuses on a later stage of innovative processes than reward theory.  
Prospect theory is concerned with the efficient pursuit of practical 
implementations of a newly discovered invention.  The view that patent 
rights may play a key role in this type of prospecting for practical 
applications was first developed by Professor Edmund Kitch.107  Under 
this view, the issuance of a patent is likened to the recognition of a 
prospector’s claim under mining law.  The holder of patent rights, like 
the holder of a mining claim, is given an exclusive opportunity to search 
for something valuable in the protected domain and to bring it to the 
public.  In the context of patented inventions, this involves the 
transformation of a patented invention from an early stage, often barely 
workable form, into a more useful and thoroughly understood product 
ready for manufacturing, distribution, and public adoption.108 
The prospecting phase may also entail the search for additional 
application settings in which a patented invention appears to have the 
potential to be used in a variety of fields.  For example, if a patented 
invention involves a new design for a hinge that is initially used in the 
automotive field, the patent holder might prospect during the life of his 
 
107. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 272–79 (1977). 
108. See id. 
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or her patent for a variety of other application settings, such as the 
cabinetry field, in which the new hinge arrangement would also have 
particular value.  The patent holder might then seek to license 
manufacturers to make and to sell in the relevant settings beyond 
automotive designs to ensure that the patented design was used in those 
settings, albeit with corresponding license fees paid to the patent holder.  
This sort of prospecting for new application fields due to the 
encouragement of patent rights has the potential to bring a patented 
invention into more hands than would be the case if an innovator had 
no economic interest in applications beyond the area of the innovator’s 
primary manufacturing and marketing capabilities and main chance to 
commercialize his or her invention. 
Overall, advocates of the prospecting view of patent rights feel that 
the enforcement of patent rights to ensure that an exclusive opportunity 
to engage in this type of product and application prospecting achieves 
many of the same benefits gained by legal recognition of mining claims 
in mineral prospecting settings.  In the patent setting, these benefits 
include avoiding the duplication of effort in prospecting for workable or 
improved versions of patented inventions, maintaining substantial 
incentives for investment in the development of such inventions, 
reducing the need for devotion of resources to secrecy or physical 
security measures for protecting the inventions, and aiding the patent 
holder in maintaining control over the later use of the invention so as to 
ensure that the patent holder receives rewards for successful 
prospecting and not other imitators.109 
As with the initial pursuit of an invention, prospecting for useful 
implementations of an already discovered invention can often be 
furthered by group actions undertaken through corporate efforts.  Many 
of the same sorts of advantages of group processes and collective 
resources already described concerning the discovery of new inventions 
will generally also aid post-invention steps to produce useful product 
designs incorporating the innovations and to perfect those designs. 
In some contexts, there are clear reasons to expect that established 
corporate organizations will be more effective and efficient in 
prospecting for products following the development of a patented 
innovation or the acquisition of a patent interest than individuals who 
are primarily experts in the field of an invention.  In a corporate setting, 
particularly in a large corporation with an established product design 
staff and experience with the consumer needs and interests of a given 
 
109. Id. at 276–79. 
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field, a wealth of product design expertise and experience can be 
applied to a product prospecting program.  A new innovation becomes a 
new tool or design element that is thrown into an existing design mix, to 
which product designers add a broad array of design experience.  These 
experienced product designers will tend to have design insights about 
useful design features and be able to avoid design flaws to a greater, 
faster extent than less experienced designers.  The result should be 
functionally better, more extensive, and faster product designs than 
would be possible for an individual innovator either acting alone or with 
the few additional product design specialists the individual’s resources 
could bring into the process. 
Preexisting corporate expertise regarding the manufacturing of 
similar products may also aid product designers in large companies to 
take a patented discovery and quickly transform it into products that 
can be produced effectively and efficiently.  Again, the preexisting 
experience and expertise of persons already in a corporate organization 
may allow that organization to marshal an effective manufacturing 
design and implementation program for new products based on a 
patented design when other parties new to the field would either design 
unmanufacturable products or take far longer to work out the 
manufacturing problems with new products based on patented designs. 
Corporate ownership may also be an effective vehicle for combining 
product design and manufacturing expertise and experience held in one 
corporation with control over a patented design held in another 
corporation.  By establishing a joint venture to design and produce 
products based on the patented design and then operating this joint 
venture through a new corporation that is jointly owned by the 
technology contributor and the source of product design and 
manufacturing expertise, a newly-formed corporation can bring together 
access to a patented design and the expertise needed to effectively 
translate the design into mass-produced products that can be marketed 
and delivered to the public.  The shared ownership of the technology 
originator and the experts in product design and marketing will ensure 
that all these relevant parties will be motivated to promote their 
corporation’s interests and work diligently to bring successful products 
into the market.  This type of new corporation achieves the same type of 
linkage of product design and manufacturing expertise with rights to a 
new invention that occurs in a large, established corporation when one 
of its research personnel achieves a new patented invention and the 
corporation’s own design staff and manufacturing specialists determine 
how to implement the invention in new products and how to 
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manufacture those products. 
C. Disclosure Theory 
Another interpretation of patent rights finds the justification for 
such rights in their potential to encourage the disclosure of otherwise 
secret or overlooked knowledge about patented inventions.  From this 
perspective, patent rights are given in exchange for disclosures of 
inventions through published patent applications.  Such rights are seen 
as a means to ensure that discoveries of exceptional product and process 
designs—that is, designs that are not merely obvious variations of prior 
designs produced through incremental, everyday engineering 
processes—are not lost to the public by being ignored or concealed 
when made, but are brought to public attention.110  This approach to 
patent rights does not turn on how various discoveries were made, how 
much effort was invested in making the discoveries, or on whether 
patent incentives were needed to encourage the discoveries.  Rather, 
patents have merit under this theory due to the need to encourage 
parties with valuable and unusual product or process designs to make 
these available to the public so that the designs can be used through the 
permission of the patent holders in present activities, used freely when 
the patents expire, and provide the starting point for additional product 
and process improvements.111 
 
110. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, 1 THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 2.3 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
[T]he grant of property rights (and thereby the creation of incentives) is 
reconditioned on compliance by the patent applicant with statutory requirements 
that make a public disclosure of the inventions. . . . The public record gives 
information for others in their own work. 
 Thus, while patent laws give rights to inventors, it seeks to promote the public 
disclosure of scientific and technological data.  At least in theory, this perpetuates a 
process of innovation among a community of scholars using shared information. 
Id. 
111. Assurance provided by patent rights may also encourage disclosures of 
technological advances through publications outside of patents.  For example, the potential 
impact of software patents on voluntary disclosure practices at the AT&T Corporation was 
described by one of its attorneys as follows: 
One of the functions served by patents is to disclose [new technological advances] to 
the public. . . . Patents themselves of course contain disclosures, but also in an 
organization like mine again, we encourage publication of technical ideas, in fact last 
year we published some forty-four hundred technical articles.  Many of these would 
not have been published if we could not also have concurrently filed patent 
applications so that the publication of the technical papers would not compromise 
the value of our inventions included in the disclosures. 
UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PUBLIC HEARING ON USE OF THE  
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Under this type of disclosure theory, patents are aimed at ensuring 
that, as product and process designs reach new plateaus of knowledge 
through leaps forward in technical understanding, these plateaus are 
available to all users and designers through patent-induced design 
disclosures.  By creating incentives for design disclosures—and the 
ultimate free availability of the disclosed designs after expiration of the 
applicable patents—patent rights can overcome what might otherwise 
be a preference for secret commercialization of new designs by 
innovators.  Patent incentives for disclosure also encourage innovators 
to take a broad view of invention value, giving them reasons to pursue 
and to disclose inventions outside of the fields in which the innovators 
possess self-commercialization capabilities. 
Disclosure incentives associated with patent rights may be 
particularly important with respect to innovations made in large 
corporate organizations.  A large corporation that discovered a product 
or process that was capable of being used in secret might have sufficient 
resources—or be able to assemble such resources—to maintain the 
secrecy of the advance and use it to commercial advantage without 
revealing it to the world.  Indeed, absent patent protection, such secrecy 
would probably be a corporation’s optimal course of action because 
revealing the innovation would make it available to competitors that 
could use the innovation to their own competitive advantage without 
bearing any of the costs of developing the innovation.  Hence, patent 
incentives may be particularly important in extracting commercially 
valuable designs from large corporate organizations that have means of 
commercially exploiting those designs in secret and that would tend to 
do so were the incentives and controls of patent rights not available. 
Concealment of a new advance may also seem to a company to be its 
best course in the absence of patent rights when a particular advance is 
more suitable for effective exploitation by the company’s competitors 
than by the innovating company itself.  If the innovator cannot achieve a 
substantial commercial gain from a new design, but its competitors 
could, the release of the design to the public would differentially favor 
the competitor and the innovator would suffer both the costs of 
development and whatever further costs resulted from the strengthened 
competition from the second firm.  However, with patent rights, a 
company with an innovation is encouraged to disclose the innovation 
 
PATENT SYSTEM TO PROTECT SOFTWARE-RELATED INVENTIONS 7 (1994) (statement of  
William Ryan, Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. and AT&T general counsel), available at  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/sanjose/sjhrng.pdf. 
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even if it will aid a competitor because the competitor can be forced to 
pay royalties for usage of the innovation. 
Indeed, the attachment of patent rights to a new innovation can 
cause a company to re-evaluate or “mine” various types of innovations 
that it cannot use in its own operations, but would be valuable to other 
parties.  Such innovations would tend to be ignored in companies if no 
patent rights or other controls over the innovations were available 
because the disclosure of the innovations would produce no particular 
advantage to the company that discovered the innovations.  However, 
with patent rights, a company is not only encouraged to disclose 
innovations that are potentially valuable outside of the company’s field 
but also given incentives to actively publicize and to explain the features 
and availability of the new technology in ways that will bring it to the 
attention of potential adopters.  Patent holders are encouraged to 
engage in active disclosures and publicity about patented advances 
because resulting increases in the adoption of the patented inventions 
will tend to expand the patent holder’s total patent royalties. 
D. Rent Dissipation Theory 
Rent dissipation theory adopts a somewhat different view of the 
significance of patents in the period immediately after a patent issues.  
Instead of being concerned with encouraging product prospecting by a 
patent holder, rent dissipation theory focuses on avoiding wasteful 
activities by others, thereby maximizing the incremental value (or 
“monopoly rent”) that use of a patented invention is capable of bringing 
to society.112  Rent dissipation occurs when some of this value is wasted 
or “dissipated.”  For example, rent dissipation may occur if multiple 
parties compete in a redundant, wasteful fashion to solve a particular 
technological problem.113 
The interpretation of patent rights as a means to avoid rent 
dissipation holds that patent rights encourage disclosures of successful 
 
112. Two leading proponents of the rent dissipation summarized this theory in regards 
to patents: 
 Rent dissipation theory posits that society profits from innovations, often 
realizing benefits far in excess of the inventor’s development costs.  The difference 
between what society would pay for an innovation and its actual cost of 
development—the rent—is awarded to the inventor in the form of a monopoly right; 
otherwise competition by imitators would discourage innovation by making it 
unprofitable. 
Grady & Alexander, supra note 12, at 308. 
113. Id. 
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inventions that help to avoid some types of post-invention rent 
dissipation.  Patent rights are believed to have two valuable impacts in 
this regard.  First, the lure of patent rights encourages intense 
competition to develop initial inventions and rapid disclosure of early-
stage versions of the inventions, thereby accelerating the point at which 
duplicative efforts to develop the invention can be identified and will 
tend to be stopped.114  Second, patents reduce subsequent rent 
dissipation by discouraging duplicate efforts to create product 
implementations of patented inventions.115 
When one innovator produces a useful design and gains a related 
patent, the resulting rights give that party exclusive control (during the 
life of the patent) over the subsequent implementation of products and 
services based on the patented design.  This includes designs that extend 
the patented design in some way, meaning that the patent holder has 
effective control over how design improvement steps will proceed in 
seeking enhancements to the patented invention. 
Advocates of the rent dissipation view of patent rights argue that 
patent holders will administer this product improvement process in an 
efficient manner over the range of potential improvements signaled by a 
patented invention.  Patent holders will pursue (or encourage others to 
pursue) reasonable invention improvement efforts of this sort because 
patent holders stand to gain the most in net licensing revenue from such 
an efficient course of subsequent product improvement.  Their self-
interest will cause patent holders to tend to cut off or to avoid inefficient 
rent dissipation by duplicate innovators seeking improvements in a 
patented technology.  Hence, patent rights are seen as having a valuable 
impact in the post-patent issuance period by reducing rent dissipation 
regarding the patented invention, thereby maximizing society’s net gain 
from the invention.116 
However, when additional lines of improvement are not signaled by 
a patented invention—that is, they are not obvious to average 
practitioners in the field given knowledge of the patented invention—
patent holders will probably not administer efficient attempts at 
improvement in these unforeseen additional directions.  Hence, these 
types of improvement efforts should probably not remain under the 
control of patent holders.  To achieve this, patent rights should, 
according to adherents to the rent dissipation view of patents, be 
 
114. Id. at 316–21. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 318. 
GRUNER ARTICLE - FORMATTED 4/24/2006  6:49:31 AM 
54  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
 
interpreted as being inapplicable to such un-signaled and unforeseeable 
types of modifications to patented designs.117 
The rent dissipation reduction implications of patent rights and 
disclosures may be particularly important with respect to the types of 
innovations that tend to be developed in corporate settings with large 
amounts of supporting resources.  There are several reasons why, absent 
patent incentives and disclosures, rent dissipation due to parallel 
development programs may be particularly large in corporate settings. 
First, the tendency of various corporations will be to conduct 
research programs in secret and to maintain their results in secret forms 
for as long as possible to forestall adoption of the resulting innovations 
by competitors.  The longer this type of secrecy extends, the more likely 
it is that another company will progress down similar research paths, 
setting up the type of duplicative research efforts that early disclosures 
encouraged by patent rights can help to prevent. 
Second, enormous resources are committed by corporations to 
particular research efforts in some high-tech fields.  If even a few 
instances of duplicate expenditures of such large quantities of resources 
can be prevented by patent rights and disclosures, a significant amount 
of rent dissipation and waste to society can be avoided. 
Third, by clarifying that an effort to improve particular patented 
products will be under the control of the patent holder, the enforcement 
of patents may strengthen investor confidence in backing efforts to 
develop improvements to patented inventions.  By lessening the risks 
that amounts spent in developing improvements may benefit free riders 
who have not borne the costs of development, patents may facilitate the 
funding and efficient formation of corporate enterprises to produce 
those improvements, thereby avoiding rent dissipation through 
inefficient enterprise formation or under funding. 
IV. REFORMING PATENT AND CORPORATE LAWS TO PROMOTE 
INNOVATION IN CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONS 
If the collective impacts of patent and corporate laws are to 
encourage effective and efficient innovation programs in corporate 
settings and thereby maximize the number and value of new advances 
brought to the public, several changes in present patent and corporate 
laws may be desirable.  This section reviews some of these potentially 
desirable legal changes. 
 
117. Id. at 319. 
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The goal in this section is not to describe all of the changes in patent 
and corporate law that may improve innovation in corporate settings.  
The purpose here is rather just to identify a few illustrative reforms and 
the reasons why they may enhance corporate innovation.  Further 
detailed assessments of these and other like reforms will be needed to 
determine if they are desirable on balance and, if so, how they should be 
implemented within existing legal structures.  The aim here is to identify 
a few of the key elements of present patent and corporate law standards 
that merit rethinking from a corporate perspective in order to ensure 
that patents and related corporate processes strongly encourage and 
support innovation by corporate organizations. 
A. Patent Law Reforms 
1. Changing Who Receives Patents:  Recognizing Corporate Inventors 
and Organizational Patent Applicants 
A procedural change that might both streamline the process of 
obtaining corporate patents and eliminate possible inefficiencies and 
uncertainties regarding the availability of patent rights for advances 
developed in corporate environments or with corporate backing would 
be to allow a corporation to apply directly for a patent118 related to an 
 
118. Present patent law standards preclude corporate patent applications because a 
patent application must be “made, or authorized to be made, by the inventor” of the item or 
process sought to be patented.  35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2000).  However, patent laws allow 
corporations to act as agents of inventors in pursuing some patent applications that arise in 
narrow circumstances.  The Patent Act allows a person other than an inventor (including a 
company) to pursue a patent application when the second party (1) establishes a “sufficient 
proprietary interest” in the patent—perhaps through an assignment agreement covering a 
transfer of the inventor’s interest in the patent to the corporation—and (2) the inventor 
either cannot be found after a diligent search or refuses to sign the patent application.  Id. 
§ 118.  In these circumstances, a patent application may be pursued by a corporation on 
behalf of and as an agent for the inventor, provided that the corporation can provide proof of 
the pertinent facts justifying its application on behalf of the inventor and a showing that such 
an application is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.  See id. 
 While these provisions allow for corporate-initiated patent applications in limited 
circumstances, they still retain a degree of uncertainty regarding the ability of a corporation 
to pursue an application.  The nature of a diligent search for an absent inventor will be 
somewhat unclear in a particular setting, raising questions about the adequacy of a corporate 
application based on inventor absence.  When an inventor is present but hesitates to sign an 
application, it will be unclear as to what point this hesitation becomes a refusal to sign a 
corporate application.  In addition, a corporation seeking to pursue an application under the 
above provisions will need to show that its action on behalf of an inventor is needed to 
preserve the rights of the parties, perhaps due to a likely loss of the opportunity to obtain a 
patent if there is a further delay in filing an application. 
 Furthermore, even when a refusal to sign is clearly present, the documentation of that 
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invention made by corporate employees while working within the scope 
of their employment or by other agents of a corporation when acting 
within the scope of their agency relationships.119  The net effect of this 
change would be to recognize that the corporation is the primary party 
in interest in these situations and to grant any resulting patent directly 
to the corporation. 
Typically, employees working in a corporate environment are 
subject to an ongoing obligation under the contractual terms of their 
employment to assign any patent rights resulting from their work to 
their corporations.120  Given the general enforceability of these contract 
 
refusal may raise other questions about the validity of the patent that would result from a 
corporate application.  When an inventor has refused to sign an application and indicates that 
he has refused because he thinks that (1) he is not the inventor of the item covered by the 
application, (2) the application misstates the characteristics of the invention in some material 
respect, or (3) the corporation involved is not entitled to rights in the patent at issue, these 
types of documented sources of controversies may be used at a later point by potential 
infringers to attack the validity of the patent that issues from a corporate application. 
119. Such a change in patent laws would implement an equivalent of the “work for 
hire” doctrine under copyright law.  This doctrine specifies that, when a work is created by a 
corporate employee while working within the scope of his or her assigned duties, the 
copyright on the work is owned by the corporation involved from the outset.  17 U.S.C. 
§ 201(b) (2000) (providing that an employer, including a corporate employer, is deemed the 
author and copyright holder of a “work for hire” created by an employee within the scope of 
his or her employment and in the absence of a written agreement specifying that the 
employee retains the copyright in his or her work).  A corporation will also be deemed the 
author of a work and entitled to the copyright in that work when the corporation specially 
orders or commissions the work provided that the parties expressly agree in a signed writing 
that the work will be considered a work for hire.  Id.  The aim of specifying the work for hire 
doctrine in federal copyright statutes was, in part, to clarify the initial ownership of the 
copyright resulting from a work for hire without the need for further copyright ownership 
transfers from an individual author to an employer or other party commissioning works.  See 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). 
120. See KINNEY & LANGE, P.A., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR BUSINESS 
LAWYERS § 17.4.2 (1996) (describing the importance of such assignment agreements as basic 
features of an intellectual property management program in a business environment); see also 
id. at app. p, at 639 (containing an example of an agreement assigning all the rights in 
inventions and works of authorship of an employee to an employer). 
 A contract providing for the assignment to a corporate employer of a patent not yet 
issued will be strictly enforced if the patent meets contract law standards for enforceability.  
See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933), amended by 289 
U.S. 706 (1933).  In the absence of such an agreement, an employee will also be considered to 
be obligated to assign a patent for an invention to his employer if the employee was “hired to 
invent,” that is, when his assigned duties were to pursue new designs for practical objects or 
processes.  See id.  However, when an invention happens to occur in the scope of an 
employee’s assigned work activities but those activities do not include the pursuit of 
inventions, the employee is not, in the absence of an express assignment agreement, under an 
obligation to assign her employer any patent rights arising from the invention.  In these 
circumstances, the employer whose resources and work time were used to create the 
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terms, employees assigned to work on innovation projects in corporate 
settings cannot have legitimate expectations of acquiring patent rights 
personally under present circumstances.  Consequently, the proposed 
change would not deprive many, if any, employees of patent rights that 
they would retain under present arrangements.121  These rights arising 
out of innovations in corporate workplaces are almost universally 
assigned to the corporations involved and exploited by the corporations, 
not their employees.  Similar patterns of contract provisions calling for 
required assignments of patent rights to corporate principals tend to 
prevail under the terms of agency arrangements outside of employment 
 
invention may obtain a “shop-right” to use the patented invention without paying the patent 
holder a royalty.  See id. at 188–89.  Other than this narrow shop-right, the employee will hold 
all the resulting patent rights and will be able to exclude parties other than the employer from 
making, using, and selling the patented invention. 
 The Supreme Court has described the hesitancy of federal courts to find patent 
assignment obligations on the part of employees as follows: 
 The reluctance of courts to imply or infer an agreement by the employee to 
assign his patent is due to a recognition of the peculiar nature of the act of invention, 
which consists neither in finding out the laws of nature, nor in fruitful research as to 
the operation of natural laws, but in discovering how those laws may be utilized or 
applied for some beneficial purpose, by a process, a device or a machine.  It is the 
result of an inventive act, the birth of an idea and its reduction to practice; the 
product of original thought; a concept demonstrated to be true by practical 
application or embodiment in tangible form. 
 Though the mental concept is embodied or realized in a mechanism or a 
physical or chemical aggregate, the embodiment is not the invention and is not the 
subject of a patent.  This distinction between the idea and its application in practice 
is the basis of the rule that employment merely to design or to construct or to devise 
methods of manufacture is not the same as employment to invent.  Recognition of 
the nature of the act of invention also defines the limits of the so-called shop-right, 
which shortly stated, is that where a servant, during his hours of employment, 
working with his master’s materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an 
invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master a non-exclusive 
right to practice the invention.  This is an application of equitable principles.  Since 
the servant uses his master’s time, facilities, and materials to attain a concrete result, 
the latter is in equity entitled to use that which embodies his own property and to 
duplicate it as often as he may find occasion to employ similar appliances in his 
business.  But the employer in such a case has no equity to demand a conveyance of 
the invention, which is the original conception of the employee alone, in which the 
employer had no part. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
121. However, the proposal would alter the patterns of patent ownership regarding 
inventions developed by employees working within the scope of their employment, but who 
are not subject to a patent assignment agreement or who specifically hired to work on 
developing inventions.  Ownership of patents resulting from such inventions are presently 
held by the employees.  Id.  The proposal would place the ownership of such patents for 
inventions created in the course of employment in the hands of the corporate employer of the 
inventor. 
GRUNER ARTICLE - FORMATTED 4/24/2006  6:49:31 AM 
58  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
 
settings, making the immediate impact of the proposal on patent 
ownership by non-employee agents modest as well. 
The proposed change to allow a corporate application for a patent 
covering an invention made in a corporate environment has several 
advantages over the presently prevailing two-step process of an 
individual-initiated patent application followed by a patent ownership 
assignment executed by the patent applicant in favor of his or her 
corporation.  By allowing a corporation to apply directly, the inattention 
or resistance of an individual inventor in completing a patent 
application and then a related assignment agreement will not impede or 
create uncertainty about corporate ownership of a patent arising out of 
an innovation program that a company has funded and supported.  By 
reducing the uncertainty of company managers and investors about the 
ability of a company to follow through and obtain patent rights 
regarding an innovation, corporate patent applications and resulting 
patents issued directly to corporations should increase the value and 
strength of patent incentives for innovation and the willingness of 
investors to back those efforts.  With the confidence that it will control 
resulting patent rights without further concern over the cooperation of 
particular employees in seeking those rights, a corporation might be 
more certain of its ability to obtain patents and associated rewards and, 
therefore, engage in greater search efforts to discover patentable 
inventions. 
Furthermore, the issuance of patents directly to a corporation may 
avoid adverse skewing of patent-related rewards and incentives towards 
those few individuals within corporate organization who fit patent law 
standards for “inventors” and, consequently, whose cooperation with 
the completion of patent applications and assignments is needed to 
perfect corporate patent rights.  Because their cooperation with the 
relevant “paperwork” is particularly important to their corporations, 
these individuals may reap especially high rewards from their 
corporations for these ministerial tasks even though their contribution 
to a patented invention is no greater than other parties.  A more 
rational and effective incentive scheme may entail the sharing by a 
broader range of employees of patent-related rewards as granted under 
an employer’s performance bonus or royalty sharing systems.  A 
corporation should be able to adjust these rewards to innovators or 
parties supporting innovation to a pattern that the corporation’s 
management feels will most effectively and efficiently promote internal 
efforts to produce innovations without the skewing effect of the special 
status of patent applicants within a group of corporate employees 
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meaningfully contributing to a patented invention. 
2. Changing What is Received:  Clarifying the Scope and Value of 
Patents 
To the extent that perceived patent value encourages both the 
organization of corporate efforts to innovate and the backing of those 
efforts by investors, the more that patents have a clear, determinable 
value, the more carefully and accurately corporations can match their 
innovation efforts and investors can match the scope of their support 
and investment backing to the probable value of resulting products to 
society.  Because they control the making, using, and selling of products 
that incorporate the patented inventions,122 patents have a value that 
depends directly on the amounts that consumers will pay for access to 
products based on the patented inventions.  This amount, in turn, 
reflects the consumers’ perceptions of the increased value to them of the 
patented invention relative to non-patented substitutes.  In a sense, 
patents serve as an economic surrogate for the exclusive opportunity to 
market patented products.  Because the prices consumers are willing to 
pay for products incorporating patented inventions will roughly equal 
the amount of increased utility that they gain from the products,123 the 
overall economic value of the opportunity to market patented products 
is a good measure of the social usefulness of those products as reflected 
in consumer preferences and the prices that consumers are willing to 
pay for access to the patented products. 
By offering means to clarify patent enforceability, scope, and value 
and by establishing means for communicating the resulting values for 
various patents, the patent system can create clear signals about the 
scope of utility of various patented inventions and give corporate 
managers useful signals about not only how to prioritize product 
 
122. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). 
123. If a product with a patented feature costs more than substitute items not subject to 
patent controls, consumers will only pay an amount for the item with the patented feature up 
to the increased utility they feel that they will gain from that item over the substitutes.  Thus, 
for example, if a new cell phone with a patented feature costs $150.00, but other cell phones 
are available at $100.00, a rational consumer will only buy the phone with the patented 
feature if that phone has an incremental functionality that the consumer feels is worth the 
incremental cost.  Because most patents cover improved designs on existing products and the 
prior, unpatented versions of those products are typically still available and in competition 
with the newer, patented versions, prices for patented items are typically in clear competition 
with the prices for somewhat less desirable, unpatented versions of the same products.  
Hence, a party offering a patented version of an earlier product must justify any price 
increment involved in terms of identifiable increases in product functionality and value to the 
consumer. 
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development efforts when multiple choices are available, but also about 
the range of expenses of development that will be cost-effective for a 
particular invention.  Similarly, investors presented with a range of 
potential investments in innovative enterprises—or with choices 
between investments in such enterprises and other investments in less 
innovative enterprises involving less risky business activities—will be 
able to look to the projected value of a present or anticipated patent as 
an indicator of a likely rate of return from an investment in a corporate 
innovator holding the patent. 
Presently, there are many sources of errors in patent value estimates 
that may reduce investors’ incentives to make investments in 
corporations that rely on patent rights and related market exclusivity as 
key features of their business plans.  A thorough assessment of the 
projected value of a patent requires several complex steps, including:  
(1) an analysis of the meaning of the patent claims defining the scope of 
the items or processes covered by the patent, (2) a comparison of the 
claims with present and anticipated products or services to determine 
the scope of manufacturing or sales activities potentially affected by the 
patent, (3) a determination of the market for the affected products or 
services, and (4) a determination of the cost or functional advantage—
and hence, the increased marketable value—of products or services 
incorporating or relying on the patented invention over other 
unpatented substitutes.124  Clearly, there is some potential for 
speculation and error at each of these steps. 
These sorts of assessments of patent value are subject to further 
uncertainty if there are reasons to expect that the patent under scrutiny 
may be held invalid and unenforceable.125  Also, a patented design or 
method may unexpectedly lose its functional advantage and 
corresponding value due to the later development of alternative 
technologies that provide more useful or less expensive substitutes for 
the patented technology.126  In addition, the value of an exclusive 
marketing opportunity that is protected by an enforceable patent is 
subject to risks that a company will fail to properly follow up on the 
opportunity and gain all the available profits due to errors in the 
 
124. See Method and System for Rating Patents and Other Intangible Assets, U.S. 
Patent No. 6,556,992 (filed Sept. 14, 2000) (issued Apr. 29, 2003) (describing methods of 
patent valuation). 
125. See, e.g., RICHARD RAZGAITIS, VALUATION AND PRICING OF TECHNOLOGY-
BASED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 30 (2003). 
126. See id. 
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company’s manufacturing or marketing processes.127 
Furthermore, the types of information needed for patent valuations, 
such as costs and earnings from specific products and design 
approaches, are rarely available to the public.  Detailed figures on these 
characteristics of business activities are typically kept confidential by 
companies to avoid aiding competitors.  Hence, patent valuation studies 
either need to be conducted with the cooperation of the affected 
companies or need to be based on estimates of many of the relevant cost 
and profit figures. 
Two types of changes in patent law standards might help to clarify 
patent values and strengthen investors’ abilities to interpret the business 
significance of patents.  The first type of change involves alterations in 
legal standards and procedures that will provide more information at an 
earlier point to investors on the likely scope of patent protections and 
the corresponding range of products and services that a given patent will 
control.  The second type of change involves adjustments in patent 
remedy standards to specify a presumptively correct minimum amount 
of damages for infringement, thereby making the value of patents in 
litigation more predictable.  This litigation value will define a minimum 
estimated value for a patent that will apply in a “worst case” scenario 
when all attempts to generate other profits from a patented invention 
through product sales or patent licensing are unsuccessful and litigation 
is required to gain value from patent rights. 
Because uncertainty about the enforceability of a patent in 
commercially significant settings will reduce the perceived value of the 
patent, the accurate estimation of patent value would benefit from the 
availability of any post-issuance means to clarify the enforceability of a 
patent or at least to establish the absence of a risk of invalidity or 
unenforceability that would otherwise raise questions about the patent’s 
value.128 
For example, an enhanced reexamination procedure that gives a 
patent holder an inexpensive means to clarify that a specific prior art 
device or process does not provide a ground for questioning the validity 
of a given patent might provide important reassurances to investors, 
particularly when prior art has been discovered after the examination of 
a patent and is, therefore, not within the examiner’s assessment of the 
 
127. See id. 
128. The risk of successful challenges to the validity of a patent is a major source of 
uncertainty and reduced patent value.  See id. 
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patentability of the invention involved.129 
Alternatively, to gain an assessment of patent validity in these 
circumstances that is not tainted by possible USPTO bias, another type 
of useful proceeding might be a special form of declaratory judgment 
action in which a patent holder could seek to clarify its title or control 
over a set of product or process designs and associated marketing 
opportunities.  This sort of action would serve a purpose somewhat like 
a “quiet title” action in real property law.130  Under this procedure, a 
patent holder would be able to describe a range of products anticipated 
to be manufactured and marketed based on a patented design and to 
seek a ruling interpreting the relevant patent and determining whether 
the company holds the rights to exclude others from marketing goods 
similar to the indicated products.  This type of action might also allow a 
patent holder to identify particular items of prior art apparently 
threatening the validity of the patent in question—particularly prior art 
sources not considered by the examiner who reviewed the patent—and 
to request that the court find that the prior art does not render the 
indicated patent invalid.  Once patent scope and validity questions were 
addressed in a declaratory judgment proceeding such as this, subsequent 
litigants who were not parties to the declaratory judgment proceedings, 
while not completely barred from raising similar questions, could be 
 
129. For a complete description of present criteria for reexamination of issued patents 
by the USPTO, see Sherry M. Knowles et al., Inter Partes Patent Reexamination in the United 
States, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 614–25 (2004), and Frederick C. Williams, 
Giving Inter Partes Patent Reexamination a Chance to Work, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 265, 273–87 
(2004). 
130. A quiet title action typically entails a judicial proceeding to resolve adverse or 
inconsistent claims to disputed property.  See generally Del Webb Conservation Holding 
Corp. v. Tolman, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (D. Nev. 1999).  A leading treatise describes the 
purposes behind such actions as the following: 
[T]o protect an owner of legal title from being disturbed in his or her possession and 
from being harassed by suits in regard to that title by persons setting up unjust and 
illegal pretensions.  Quiet title actions are also intended to allow holders of 
equitable interests the right to remove from their way to legal title any unlawful 
hindrance having the appearance of a better right. 
65 AM. JUR. 2D Quieting Title § 1 (2003).  Statutes providing for actions to quiet title 
generally permit resolution of every claim through which a plaintiff may be deprived of his or 
her property or through which its value may be depreciated.  Id. § 13.  These threats that can 
be resolved in a quiet title action include prospective activities or interests of other parties 
from which the plaintiff in the quiet title action anticipates injury.  See id. § 28.  For example, 
in Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. City of Omaha, 90 N.W. 1005 (Neb. 1902), the court 
considered the future impact of an attempt to collect taxes and the possibility of an associated 
lien being placed on property as a sufficient threat to be resolved through a quiet title action.  
The court held that a plaintiff in such an action was only entitled to relief quieting title if the 
tax in question was absolutely void.  Id. at 1005. 
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required to overcome the ruling in the declaratory judgment proceeding 
with a particularly strong evidentiary showing. 
This type of declaratory patent ruling would identify the types of 
product features in the field of the proposed products that are exclusive 
to the patent holder based on the patent at issue, thereby creating a 
relatively certain basis for a corresponding market potential analysis.  
Such a ruling would give clear backing to the business formation and 
funding efforts surrounding the patent and products at issue. 
Clarity as to the value of patents would be increased if legal 
standards were adjusted to confirm that recoverable damages associated 
with patent infringement—and, by implication, the value of the relevant 
patent if its holder is pressed to the point of litigation—will generally be 
no less than an amount that is at least roughly predictable at patent 
issuance.  For example, a presumptively correct floor on patent damages 
might be set at the amount of the net profits made by infringers on sales 
of an infringing product provided that the patent holder had sufficient 
product manufacturing and marketing capabilities to make it reasonably 
probable that the patent holder could have concluded the same sales. 
This type of presumed floor on patent damages—or some other 
predictable floor that was apparent early in the life of each patent—
would allow patent holders to predict the probable litigation value and 
worth of a patent based on the actual or, more likely, the estimated 
pricing and production practices of competitors selling infringing 
products.  The expected conduct of infringers can be projected from 
their past sales of earlier, non-infringing products, with adjustments in 
the price to reflect the greater attraction of the patented versions of the 
products and further adjustments in expected profit levels to reflect 
differences, if any, in the production costs of the patented and 
unpatented product versions. 
This patent damage estimate assumes that the patent infringers from 
whom the patent holder will recover damages are reasonably competent 
business persons and that their profits from sales of infringing items are 
good approximations for the profits the patent holder could have gained 
absent the infringement.  In litigation, a patent holder should have the 
option of proving even greater actual damages, based on showings of 
such factors as a likelihood that the patent holder could have charged 
higher prices for the patented item than were charged by the infringers 
or that the patent holder would have had lower production costs and 
greater profits per unit of the patented item. 
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3. Changing Where Patentable Innovations are Produced:  Altering 
Inventorship Standards to Encourage the Formation of Innovative 
Groups and Projects 
Other patent law changes may cause patents to better encourage the 
formation of working groups for the pursuit of innovation efforts.  
Patent law standards might aid in the formation of these groups by 
altering notions of who qualifies as an inventor and patent co-owner to 
include all those parties whose involvement in a group project is critical 
to the discovery and initial commercial development of a new 
innovation.  The idea behind this reform is that the coalescence of a new 
joint venture between companies or a new start-up company can best be 
encouraged by giving all of the essential players in these enterprises an 
ownership interest in the resulting intellectual property.131  In the patent 
sphere, this can be achieved by adjusting patent ownership standards to 
recognize the full range of participants in group innovation as co-owners 
of the patents resulting from an innovation. 
To encourage group formation, inventorship standards might be 
adjusted to include as inventors, or as persons sharing initial patent 
ownership, all those persons who contribute skills or resources that are 
material in developing the concept for a new invention or whose skills 
were needed to reduce an invention to practice, not just those who 
actually conceived of an invention.  This change would make the 
contributors of critically important skills and resources parties who are 
inherently interested in the long-term usefulness of the resulting 
inventions because they will share in the co-ownership of patents that 
 
131. Of course, multiple participants in a group endeavor can agree among themselves 
to contractually determined patterns of intellectual property ownership that will allocate 
fractional ownership interests as the parties see fit and thereby create incentives to join 
together in innovative groups to maximize the value of the intellectual property involved.  
For example, parties in a company pursuing innovative product designs might agree that all 
patents resulting from their efforts would be assigned to a given corporation and that the 
fractional ownership interests of each of the parties would be handled through allocations of 
percentages of the overall stock ownership of the company. 
 The difference between this presently available process, the proposed revisions to 
inventorship standards, and the resulting range of initial patent ownership is that the 
proposed system would start any ownership allocation transaction with a broader set of 
shared interests and joint incentives for innovation.  Using this set of shared interests as a 
default condition or bargaining starting point may reduce transaction costs regarding the 
process of achieving the parties desired ownership allocation because fewer transfers of 
interest may be needed to achieve a desirable set of incentives.  This allocation may also 
avoid some of the effects of bargaining failures.  Even if the parties were unable to bargain 
effectively to reallocate their interests, the law will guarantee each participant in the joint 
innovation enterprise a co-owner’s fractional share in the resulting patent interests. 
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stem from the inventions.  As co-owners, they will be willing to invest 
their own efforts in proportion to the long-term advantages of the 
resulting patented inventions. 
Alternatively, a functionally similar result might be achieved under 
existing inventorship standards through contracts promising participants 
in innovation efforts assignments of fractional interests in resulting 
patents or fractional interests in royalties resulting from those patents.  
A third approach to reach a similar result would be to establish a 
corporation surrounding an innovation effort, to allow the corporation 
to apply directly for patents or obligate researchers to assign patents 
resulting from the innovation effort to that corporation, and to give each 
of the relevant participants in the innovation efforts a fractional stake in 
the patent-owning corporation. 
4. Changing When Patents are Available:  Establishing Patent Value at 
Earlier Stages of Innovation 
Indications of potential commercial value can arise in the 
progressive understanding of an innovation before any particular 
practical application of the innovation may be apparent.  In order to 
ensure that an innovation at this promising stage attracts management’s 
attention and the investment of resources needed for later stages of 
product prospecting and development, a patent interest should be 
available for an innovation at the earliest possible stages of its 
development. 
Several types of patent law adjustments might help to advance the 
recognition of patent rights to earlier stages of the development of an 
innovation.  These desirable changes include shifts in utility standards to 
demand only a small showing of utility of a sort indicating that an 
innovation is suitable for prospecting for products and for related 
corporate and investor backing.  Current patent law standards preclude 
a patent for a discovery until it is “refined and developed to [the] point . 
. . where specific benefit [from the discovery] exists in currently 
available form.”132  This compels parties developing innovations to bring 
inventions to a stage of development in which they can establish the 
present utility of the invention before they can obtain a patent.  
However, in order to encourage early-stage backing of invention design 
perfection and product implementation efforts, patent standards might 
be altered to recognize sufficient utility in an invention for patenting 
when the state of knowledge regarding the invention is such that there is 
 
132. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966). 
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a promising range of likely applications and investor backing of the 
development of those applications is likely to be advanced by patents 
governing the resulting products.  Once patents are issued at this stage, 
aggressive fundraising to support large-scale development efforts can 
start at an earlier point than would be the case if patenting is delayed to 
a later stage of invention development. 
Recognition of patent interests, or at least probable patent interests, 
at earlier stages of innovation development would also be furthered by 
changes in patent laws to implement mechanisms for speeding the 
patent application and issuance processes.  Changes to speed these 
processes might include new provisions for expedited patent application 
filing requirements that would ease and speed the process of patent 
filing so as to make the review and issuance of a patent more rapid,133 
greater use of interim reviews by patent examiners such that the likely 
scope of an ultimate patent can be better predicted at the early stages of 
patent application processing,134 and increased use of applicant-funded 
expedited processing of patent applications, at least when such 
applicant-funded procedures will not prejudice the normal handling of 
applications by parties who do not have the resources to invoke these 
special procedures.135 
 
 
133. For example, a patent applicant might be required—or at least given the option—
to submit complete information about the prior art searches she, or her patent searching 
specialist, had conducted, along with assessments of how components of the prior art found in 
these searches compare with the invention being sought to be patented.  While these searches 
and critiques would not be binding on a patent examiner, they might help to avoid 
duplications of effort and speed during a patent examiner’s review of a patent application. 
134. For example, a patent examiner might issue a preliminary “triage” assessment of 
probable patentability issues identified in a quick examination of a patent application, 
thereby allowing a patent applicant to respond with quick amendments to avoid issues or with 
explanations of why the examiners concerns were misplaced or were not barriers to issuing a 
patent.  The surfacing of potential issues early in the process may allow them to be dealt with 
quickly and efficiently before both the examiner’s and the applicant’s time is wasted on 
unnecessary analyses and submissions. 
135. This type of applicant funding of patent reviews by reliable personnel selected by 
the USPTO would be a parallel to the applicant-funded procedures used in some county 
planning offices to speed reviews of major building projects and accelerate the issuance of 
building permits.  So long as the availability of specially-funded and speeded applications 
processes does not prejudice the result in favor of patent applicants with sufficient funds to 
obtain expedited processing and the availability of such processing does not create greater 
delays or other incremental problems for un-expedited applicants, the speed accomplished 
through specially funded patent application processing will aid the public by bringing 
patented inventions to public attention and availability more quickly than regular patent 
processing. 
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5. Changing How Patentable Innovations are Assessed:  Modifying 
Nonobviousness Standards to Encourage Group Innovation and the 
Accumulation of Organizational Knowledge 
Patent law standards that may discourage parties or organizations 
with accumulated knowledge and intellectual property rights in a 
particular field to form group enterprises aimed at discovering and 
commercializing further innovations could be revised to better 
encourage group innovation.  For example, standards for identifying 
relevant “prior art” for purposes of determining the novelty and 
nonobviousness of new inventions should be adjusted to ensure that 
patents encourage the formation of innovative groups in which the 
assembly of information, expertise, and resources through group 
processes are needed to bring innovations to the public.  This includes 
circumstances in which group processes are needed to promote the 
discovery of a new invention, the development of products from an 
invention, or the initiation of manufacturing and marketing of new 
products based on a new invention.  The range of advances that are seen 
as new, nonobvious designs potentially qualifying for patents should be 
adjusted to ensure that patent rights attach to innovations and 
encourage group efforts when public access to the innovations will be 
significantly furthered by group processes to develop related products, 
manufacturing programs, and marketing efforts.  This can be 
accomplished by carefully tailoring the range of prior art that is deemed 
sufficient to preclude a patent for a particular invention. 
Existing patent laws recognize that the accumulated knowledge 
gained by a single organization which is actively developing 
technological innovations in a given field should not restrict or diminish 
the opportunity of the organization to gain a patent when it develops an 
additional new invention.  This view is implemented in the Patent Act’s 
standards for determining the nonobviousness of an invention for which 
a patent is sought.136  Normally, an invention that is new and useful is 
 
136. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Id.  This test is commonly and somewhat awkwardly referred to as requiring that an invention 
exhibit “nonobviousness” in order to be patentable.  The Supreme Court has summarized the 
basic considerations in determining if an invention is nonobvious as follows: 
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences 
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of 
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nonetheless denied a patent when the invention is a mere obvious 
variation from a useful product or services already available to the 
public—that is, a mere obvious variation from the prior art of the field. 
However, a special rule applies to corporations and other 
organizations that develop and accumulate a substantial body of 
innovations in a particular field.  In such organizations, information held 
by others in the organizations at the time a further advance is made is 
not considered to be part of the prior art of the field for purposes of 
determining the nonobviousness of the further advance.  This rule is 
implemented under the following statutory provision: 
Subject matter developed by a person [other than the inventor], 
which qualifies as prior art [due to previous invention by 
another], shall not preclude patentability under [the 
nonobviousness standards of the Patent Act] where the subject 
matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the invention 
was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation 
of assignment to the same person.137 
Congress added this language to the patent statute specifically to avoid 
the invalidation of patents on the basis of the work of fellow employees 
engaged in team research.138 
This provision of patent law frequently has an impact on prior art 
and nonobviousness determinations in corporate settings.  For example, 
 
ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.  Against this background, the 
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.  Such secondary 
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, 
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the 
subject matter sought to be patented.  As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, 
these inquiries may have relevancy. 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
137. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.130 (2004) (describing required 
contents of affidavit needed to disqualify prior art under § 103(c) in the context of a patent 
examination or reexamination proceeding). 
 For purposes of applying this section of the Patent Act, “another person” has been 
interpreted by courts as meaning any inventive entity that is not identical in composition 
to any other inventive entity.  For example, when an application for a patent is made in 
the names of A and B, prior art attributable to A or to A and C is deemed to be prior art 
developed by “another person.”  See JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 3 PATENT 
LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 17:8 (2d ed. 2005). 
138. See SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS:  PATENT LAW AMENDMENTS OF 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5833 (stating 
that the provisions of § 103(c) were aimed at encouraging communications among members 
of research teams and at overturning earlier case law that had suggested that one team 
member’s earlier invention that was not made public might be treated as prior art for 
purposes of determining the novelty and nonobviousness of a later invention by a second 
team member). 
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in one case in which a corporation owned a patent on a fluidic nozzle 
and obtained a further patent on windshield washer technology, the 
corporation’s common ownership of the two patents precluded the 
nozzle patent from being used as prior art for purposes of determining 
whether the invention covered by the windshield washer patent was 
obvious and unpatentable.139  In a typical high-tech company in which all 
employees are under an obligation to assign to their company the patent 
rights arising out of their work, this provision means that the prior work 
of one employee for the company will not affect the patentability of the 
work of a second employee even if the latter is an obvious variation of 
the work of the former.  Put in positive terms, a company’s own efforts 
to accumulate a large body of design knowledge among its employees 
does not work against a large company by lessening the scope of patent 
incentives and the rewards the company enjoys in connection with a 
new discovery. 
However, the range of circumstances in which prior, accumulated 
knowledge should be ignored in nonobviousness analyses should 
probably be expanded to encourage various types of group efforts to 
produce innovations and to promote the formation of the groups 
needed in these efforts.  One type of innovative group that probably 
deserves similar prior art treatment to that currently afforded large 
corporations involves participants in innovative teams from multiple 
corporations, universities, or other organizations.  In these settings, 
when various contributors may be adding their respective knowledge 
and that of their organizations to a group innovation effort, the 
accumulated innovative histories and knowledge of their organizations 
should not be held against them for purposes of determining the 
patentability of their discoveries in a newly formed innovation team. 
An additional category of group enterprises that plays a key role in 
bringing new innovations to the public includes combinations of parties 
that are formed after the discovery of patented inventions to engage in 
further testing of the invention and to follow on efforts to 
commercialize the inventions.  These types of enterprises are not 
specially protected by the present statutory language on the handling of 
prior art in nonobviousness assessments because these enterprises and 
the patent assignment arrangements they often entail do not predate the 
discovery of a patented invention.  Hence, the collective prior art of the 
participants in these sorts of groups are not commonly owned at the 
time of the inventions and will not come within the current provisions of 
 
139. Bowles Fluidics Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 620 F. Supp. 1297, 1306 n.7 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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the patent laws calling for special treatment of prior art under common 
ownership. 
In order to encourage a broader range of group efforts that will 
enhance the availability of innovations, patent laws might specify that 
prior art held by parties who, by the time of a patent application, have 
established contract rights specifying that the parties will collectively be 
the assignees of the patent being sought should have their prior art 
excluded from consideration for purposes of determining the 
nonobviousness of the invention covered by the application.  This will 
encourage parties holding related expertise—the sorts of parties best 
suited to form group enterprises that will effectively commercialize and 
deliver a new innovation to the public—to join together in joint 
enterprises and to participate in these joint enterprises with diligent 
product development and commercialization efforts. 
This change will expand the period in which parties can establish 
advantageous group enterprises to develop and commercialize 
innovations in a given area.  By reducing the range of prior art 
potentially undercutting resulting patents, present law favors the 
formation of corporate enterprises or other group financing and 
ownership arrangements that are formed before the discovery of a 
patentable invention.  However, under the altered rule described here, 
parties in a field with a substantial amount of accumulated expertise and 
existing intellectual property rights would be encouraged to form joint 
enterprises that follow up on the discovery of patentable inventions by 
pursuing the further development of the invention into useful products 
and the manufacturing and marketing start-up activities needed to bring 
these products to the public. 
B. Corporate Law Reforms 
A variety of corporate law reforms might promote financial backing 
for corporations’ innovative efforts by expanding shareholders’ 
understanding of the value of corporate patents and by enhancing 
corporate management’s accountability to shareholders regarding the 
pursuit and enforcement of corporate patents and related business risks.  
This subsection briefly examines some possible corporate law changes 
that would have these impacts. 
1. Specifying Required Securities Disclosures 
 When a corporation engages in a public offering to generate 
widespread investor funding for the commercialization of products that 
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are asserted to be protected by patent rights, a large portion of the value 
of the corporate enterprise involved will depend on the strength of the 
patent rights held by the entity.  Even if the products being developed 
by the corporation are popular with consumers and initially generate 
large volumes of product sales, whether or not the benefits of similar 
sales volumes will inure to the corporation over time will depend greatly 
on the scope of patent controls preventing other companies from 
jumping in and sharing the profits from the popular new products.  
Hence, even in the best of new product development situations, strong 
patent rights surrounding successful products are often needed to 
establish substantial long-term product exclusivity and corresponding 
corporate value. 
As they are being asked to invest in an enterprise that is relying 
heavily on patent rights for its future well-being, potential investors 
should have access to sufficient information to evaluate the scope and 
strength of patent rights being relied on by the company involved.  The 
information investors can evaluate in this regard and the confidence of 
investors in corporate enterprises aimed at commercializing patented 
inventions will be enhanced if corporate disclosures filed in connection 
with public stock offerings are required to include several types of 
information bearing on the future force and effect of patent rights held 
by the corporations making the offerings.140 
For example, required securities disclosures might include opinions 
from qualified patent counsel regarding the validity and scope of any 
patents that the company seeking funding is relying on for substantial 
protection of its future business operations. 141  The required disclosures 
might also include any material information held by company executives 
 
140. Cf. ROBERT A. FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE § 7:5 (2d 
ed. 1994) (describing a rule proposed by the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) in the early 1970s that would have obligated lead underwriters to develop and 
adhere to specific written due diligence procedures for investigating a company embarking on 
a public offering, including procedures for “[e]xamination of business protection devices and 
related data such as trademarks, patents, copyrights and production obsolescence, among 
others”). 
141. Topics that are presently required to be addressed in connection with new stock 
offerings by publicly traded corporations and in later ongoing disclosures by those 
corporations are addressed in Regulation S-K issued by the Federal Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).  This Regulation provides detailed guidance for compliance with the 
line-item disclosure that is required by the various forms and schedules that have to be filed 
with the SEC under both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10–249.10(b) (2004); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.4 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2004) (describing disclosures required 
in connection with new stock offerings of publicly traded entities). 
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tending to undercut or contradict the enforceability of these patents.  
These types of disclosures might be made mandatory through either 
changes in securities statutes to address patent-related disclosures 
generally or new regulations addressing the special disclosure problems 
of high-tech start-up companies relying on patent holdings as significant 
features of their business models.  Alternatively, similar changes might 
be implemented through judicial interpretations of existing securities 
law standards requiring disclosures of material information so as to 
recognize that, in the context of a company in which the business model 
relies heavily on the enforceability of particular patents and in which 
investors have a corresponding stake and interest in those patents, 
material information that must be disclosed to investors includes patent 
validity and scope evaluations held by corporate management. 
2. Clarifying Fraud Standards 
In the context of smaller-scale stock sales in which companies 
developing innovations are not making public offerings of stock and the 
formal disclosure requirements of federal securities laws do not apply, 
securities fraud laws and common law fraud standards still constrain 
how companies may describe patents and related business features as 
the companies promote sales of securities.142  Investor confidence in 
representations about corporate business potential and the role of 
patent rights in reducing corporate operating risks would be enhanced 
by fraud standards that discouraged misrepresentations about patents 
by requiring complete and accurate disclosures of corporate executives’ 
assessments regarding the validity of key corporate patents that are 
touted and relied upon in a company’s business plan.  The information 
considered and the experts consulted by executives in reaching their 
conclusions regarding patent validity and the business impact of patent 
interests should be subject to similar disclosure requirements in order to 
make a company’s positive statements about the importance of its 
patents not misleading. 
In many business settings, stock in high-tech corporate start-up 
companies will be sold to venture capitalists and other early-stage 
 
142. In general, state laws prohibit material misstatements in connection with the sale 
of a security.  In addition, an omission of information in connection with the sale of a security 
may also be the basis of liability, but typically only when, under the circumstances, the 
omission of information tends to make the provided information materially misleading.  69A 
AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation–State § 187 (2003).  Information will generally be 
considered material “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider it important in making an investment decision.”  Id. § 190. 
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corporate investors based on representations regarding the scope and 
importance of patent protections covering the company’s present or 
projected products.  Sometimes, these sorts of representations are made 
in settings where corporate managers know that there are reasons to be 
cautious about reliance on patent rights, yet these reasons for caution 
my be omitted from the statements the managers make to potential 
investors.  When a corporate manager emphasizes the future business 
importance of a company patent without including specific risk-
clarifying information the manager holds about the possible invalidity or 
restricted scope of the patent, fraud laws should recognize that the 
failure of the manager to be more forthcoming and balanced in this type 
of representation to investors amounts to a material misstatement 
regarding the future role of the patent.  Put simply, presentation of a 
rosy picture of patent significance in such a business context amounts to 
a misrepresentation when information about the favorable impacts that 
a patent is expected to have is not balanced with known information 
about patent invalidity or inapplicability to the business opportunities 
the corporation in question.  Such a material misstatement should open 
up the manager making the statement to damage liability for securities 
holders’ losses when the flaws of the patents and the negative impact of 
those flaws on corporate fortunes are later revealed. 
Of course, corporate managers should not be obligated to make 
disclosures of adverse information regarding patent enforcement in all 
circumstances.143  Two types of cases should give rise to an obligation to 
be complete in statements made about the corporate significance of 
particular patents. 
First, when managers themselves point investors to patents as key 
corporate assets and sources of reduced business risk in ensuring the 
exclusivity of marketing opportunities, corporate managers should have 
a duty to couple their positive remarks with whatever qualifying 
information that the managers have.  Absent this, the unqualified 
representations of the managers will tend to convey an unqualified 
message regarding the strength and importance of the patents 
addressed—a message that the managers involved know to be untrue.  
In short, knowing overstatement of the legal and business significance of 
patents is a type of material misstatement that fraud laws should 
 
143. Under most state standards, individuals involved in selling stock do not face 
liability for non-disclosure when the parties provide no information to buyers of the stock.  
See, e.g., McCall v. Finley, 362 S.E.2d 26, 31 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); 69A AM. JUR. 2d Securities 
Regulation–State § 187 (2003). 
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recognize as a valid basis for damage claims from investors who rely on 
corporate managers unqualified statements. 
Second, when the nature of a company’s business would naturally 
focus investors on the importance of patents in maintaining the 
exclusivity of certain product production and marketing opportunities, 
even general statements of corporate health and positive future 
potential may need to be accompanied by patent risk information held 
by executives making the statements.  The combination of an assertion 
of strong corporate performance or prospects without the associated 
disclosure of patent enforcement concerns should be seen as a material 
misstatement.  These sorts of misstatements should establish a cause of 
action giving investors a source of relief when they were misled by 
overly favorable statements about company fortunes and the company 
involved has suffered a loss due to these undisclosed risks regarding 
patent enforcement. 
In certain circumstances, professional duties or other fiduciary 
obligations possessed by persons holding information on potential 
patent invalidity or unenforceability may obligate the persons to 
disclose that information even in the absence of a positive 
representation of corporate business soundness.144  In these settings, the 
normal rule that persons holding adverse information need not disclose 
it is overcome by the professional or fiduciary duties of the parties.  
When this is the case, state fiduciary standards will require that persons 
make positive disclosures of material information regarding risks to the 
enforceability and value of corporate patents.  The failure to make such 
disclosures will open the individuals involved to damage claims from 
corporate shareholders and others who are adversely affected by the 
ultimate unenforceability of the patents involved and the resulting drop 
in corporate fortunes. 
3. Corporate Governance Standards 
Under present standards defining the duties of corporate officers 
and directors, such individuals are obligated to periodically monitor 
significant risks to corporate performance and to react when unusual 
 
144. Cf. Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 F. 308, 309–15 (N.D. Ill. 1918) (holding that 
the fiduciary obligation of the corporate director required the transfer of a patent obtained by 
the director to the corporation); PAT K. CHEW, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY 
§ 5:4.4 (1999) (“Because of their fiduciary status, directors and officers are more vulnerable 
than ordinary employees to losing ownership of their inventions.  Since the fiduciary-inventor 
has a special position of trust in the corporation, the courts may consider it inequitable for the 
fiduciaries to own their inventions.”) 
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information indicates a serious threat to future corporate well-being.145  
In the context of businesses that are based on the commercialization of 
patented inventions and in which the unexpected unenforceability of 
key patents will be a major business disaster, the duties of corporate 
leaders should be interpreted to extend to the monitoring of evolving 
circumstances affecting the enforceability and business value of 
corporate patents.146  Diligence in these monitoring efforts by corporate 
executives should aid the executives in proactively managing patent-
related risks to corporate performance.  It should also reassure 
shareholders that patent enforcement risks will be caught at a stage 
when their adverse effects on corporate performance can be minimized.  
Such monitoring by corporate executives may also detect new 
information about material patent risks that will need to be passed on to 
shareholders, thereby aiding their assessments of corporate 
performance and potential. 
This type of monitoring of patent enforceability risks is particularly 
critical when business planning at the outset of a major product 
development or manufacturing initiative has been premised on the 
assumed enforceability of key patents and the corresponding exclusivity 
of a marketing opportunity.  Resources committed to such an endeavor 
may be largely wasted if the patents are not enforceable and the 
company involved must fight to compete with several other companies 
for product sales in the same market.  Such competition will typically 
produce lower income for the patent holder for two reasons:  (1) the 
patent holder’s volume of product sales in the targeted market will go 
down because sales in that market will be shared with competitors and 
(2) each product unit will sell at a lower price determined by head-to-
head competition rather than by the temporary marketing exclusivity 
ensured by patent rights. 
Failures of corporate leaders to meet monitoring and reaction duties 
 
145. A director or officer’s failure to make reasonable inquiry into “red flags” 
suggesting adverse corporate developments or a director’s inadequate monitoring of major 
facets of corporate performance are independent grounds for finding a breach of the duty of 
care.  The receipt of information that would cause a reasonable person to suspect an adverse 
corporate development may require a director or officer to make inquiries to determine if the 
suspected problem is present.  Even absent cause for suspicion, courts have found directors 
and officers liable for inadequate monitoring of corporate affairs and inadequate oversight of 
significant corporate activities.  3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1034.80 (perm. ed. 2002). 
146. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(holding that a corporate director breaches his or her duty of care through a sustained or 
systematic failure to exercise oversight concerning major risks to corporate interests). 
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under state corporation laws can lead to damage claims against these 
individuals for losses suffered by their corporations when these losses 
would have been likely to have been avoided through more diligent 
management attention and action.  If corporate fortunes drop 
precipitously following a finding that key patents are unenforceable, 
corporate leaders who should have detected, through reasonable fact 
finding, the source of unenforceability147 or who were aware of potential 
problems with the patents but did not react by conducting a complete 
study and redirecting corporate affairs to prevent wasteful reliance on a 
flawed patent strategy148 will be personally liable to their corporation for 
the losses that their inattention caused. 
By clarifying the obligations of corporate directors and officers to 
act on behalf of shareholders in the monitoring and management of 
threats to patent enforceability and to provide shareholders with 
information about these threats so that shareholders can take their own 
protective actions, corporate duty laws are important sources of 
pressure for patent management diligence on the part of corporate 
leaders.  These pressures not only compel corporate leaders to engage in 
patent monitoring and management practices that may reduce corporate 
commitments to wasteful uses of resources in pursuit of unexpectedly 
non-exclusive marketing opportunities but may also increase 
shareholder confidence in patent-based businesses.  This last result 
should ease the formation of high-tech businesses to develop products 
and services based on patented inventions and increase the value of 
patents themselves by making them more attractive linchpins for 
business formation and financing. 
4. Information Disclosure Demands from Shareholders 
Existing corporate law standards require companies to respond to 
shareholder demands for disclosure to the shareholders of certain 
business records.149  In the past, these sorts of disclosure requirements 
 
147. See id. 
148. Cf. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (noting that 
a corporate director will face personal liability for corporate losses when the director has 
“ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee 
wrongdoing”). 
149. Under the laws of most states, corporate shareholders are entitled to review all 
the books, papers, records, federal reports, and other data of the corporation as to assets, 
liabilities, contracts, operations and practices.  See 5A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 145, 
§ 2239. 
 However, the range of records that are subject to this right is generally limited to those 
records that will aid shareholders in protecting their interests.  See id.  At least some states 
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have focused primarily on corporate financial records that shareholders 
needed to fully consider a matter under shareholder control.  However, 
the notion that shareholders are entitled to review corporate records 
related to major aspects of corporate performance might be extended to 
recognize corporate shareholders’ rights to compel disclosures of 
opinion letters regarding patent validity or other similar records on 
patent rights held by company management. 
Such a right to compel disclosure of these sorts of assessments of 
corporate patent rights and, by implication, to reveal associated business 
risks would give shareholders meaningful information allowing them to 
independently assess the possibility that key corporate patents will be 
unenforceable or inapplicable to the sorts of business activities being 
planned or undertaken by the shareholders’ corporations.  Absent these 
sorts of compelled disclosures, corporate shareholders concerned about 
patent strength and related corporate business strategies must rely on 
the thoroughness of patent evaluation studies initiated by corporate 
managers and the willingness of the managers to accurately disclose or 
describe the adverse portions of the results obtained in those studies.  
Patent evaluation and disclosure processes flowing through corporate 
managers who may have personal reasons to downplay or conceal 
problems with patents are likely to produce inadequate information for 
shareholders in many cases.  Because of over-optimism born of their 
enthusiasm for their business plan—or because of an outright 
willingness to misrepresent the range of known risks associated with 
their company’s patents—corporate leaders of high-tech businesses may 
downplay or omit disclosures to shareholders of adverse patent 
evaluation results. 
Information disclosure rights for shareholders in small companies 
that are not subject to the more formal disclosure requirements 
 
extend the right of shareholders to inspect books and records to include inspection of 
corporate contracts and other significant business papers.  See, e.g., Weigel v. O’Connor, 373 
N.E.2d 421, 426–28 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a corporate shareholder is legitimately 
entitled to know anything and everything that the records, books and papers of a company 
would show so as to protect the shareholder’s interests as long as he has an honest motive, is 
not proceeding for vexatious or speculative reasons, is seeking something more than 
satisfaction of his curiosity, and is not conducting a general fishing expedition). 
 This type of standard might support a shareholder right to inspect an opinion of counsel 
regarding the enforceability and scope of a corporate patent, at least when enforcement of 
the patent is a key aspect of a corporation’s business plan.  See Stone v. Kellogg, 46 N.E. 222, 
226 (Ill. 1896) (recognizing that the right of shareholders to review corporate records is 
“founded on the principle that the shareholders have a right to be fully informed as to the 
condition of the corporation, the manner in which its affairs are conducted, and how the 
capital to which they have contributed is employed and managed”). 
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governing pubic companies under federal securities laws would be a 
valuable means to inform shareholders regarding possible threats to 
their companies due to changes in expected patent enforceability or 
previously unappreciated weakness in patent enforcement strategies.  In 
addition, the potential for compelled disclosures of adverse patent 
evaluations would remind corporate managers in these settings that 
maintaining patent value and accurately disclosing the strength and 
business significance of corporate patents are key management 
responsibilities.  Given the threat of compelled disclosures to 
shareholders, corporate managers will understand that they can be held 
accountable for their management of patent enforcement practices and 
related business operations that rely on the force of corporate patents. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The efficient development and public dissemination of new and 
useful innovations depends on the clarity of patent incentives and the 
efficiency of corporate processes for backing innovation efforts.  
Changes in both patent and corporation laws can make the formation of 
collective enterprises for innovation both more likely and more 
efficient.  Because the public benefits from more instances of patentable 
innovation and lowered financing and administrative cost in producing 
these innovations, the strength of patent incentives and the success of 
corporate laws supporting innovative organizations are complementary 
areas of public concern. 
By adjusting the sorts of legal underpinnings described in this 
Article, legal reforms can shape patent interests and incentives so as to 
promote the formation of group enterprises that are needed for many 
complex and resource intensive forms of modern innovation and 
encourage investors to back those enterprises.  This type of 
encouragement and support for organizations that are capable of 
modern innovation is critical in a period when highly useful 
technological innovations often depend on massive commitments of 
personnel and resources. 
As modern society has increasingly come to depend on products and 
services that can only be provided effectively through large, corporate 
enterprises, the power and flexibility of corporate organizations in 
financing and organizing the provision of these products and services 
has taken on increased importance.  The premise of this Article is that 
modern innovation is more and more often a type of activity that 
requires the sorts of group action, large commitments of resources, and 
collective funding that can only be effectively accomplished through 
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corporate organizations, and that legal infrastructures, including patent 
and corporate laws, should be tailored to efficiently promote the 
creation and operation of these organizations. 
In this context, corporate patents—both promised patents for future 
innovations and issued ones for innovations that have yet to be 
transformed into publicly available products—are critically important 
focal points for corporate action that can spark complex innovative 
efforts, promote the formation of innovative groups to pursue these 
efforts, reassure business leaders about the merit of committing large 
amounts of resources to such efforts, and encourage the backing of 
complex innovation efforts by a broad set of investors.  As central 
features of innovative organizations, corporate patents and further 
corporate law standards that increase the value of patents and investor 
confidence in patent interests are critical means for expanding the 
activities of innovative corporate organizations and for increasing the 
beneficial advances these organizations bring to the public. 
